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ABSTRACt: In “Psychopower and Ordinary Madness” my ambition, as it relates to Bernard 
Stiegler’s recent literature, was twofold: 1) critiquing Stiegler’s work on exosomatization and 
artefactual posthumanism—or, more specifically, nonhumanism—to problematize approaches 
to media archaeology that rely upon technical exteriorization; 2) challenging how Stiegler 
engages with Giuseppe Longo and Francis Bailly’s conception of negative entropy. These efforts 
were directed by a prevalent techno-cultural qualifier: the rise of Synthetic Intelligence (including 
neural nets, deep learning, predictive processing and Bayesian models of cognition). This paper 
continues this project but first directs a critical analytic lens at the Derridean practice of the 
ontologization of grammatization from which Stiegler emerges while also distinguishing how 
metalanguages operate in relation to object-oriented environmental interaction by way of 
inferentialism. Stalking continental (Kapp, Simondon, Leroi-Gourhan, etc.) and analytic 
traditions (e.g., Carnap, Chalmers, Clark, Sutton, Novaes, etc.), we move from artefacts to AI 
and Predictive Processing so as to link theories related to technicity with philosophy of mind. 
Simultaneously drawing forth Robert Brandom’s conceptualization of the roles that 
commitments play in retrospectively reconstructing the social experiences that lead to our 
endorsement(s) of norms, we compliment this account with Reza Negarestani’s deprivatized 
account of intelligence while analyzing the equipollent role between language and media (both 
digital and analog). 
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§ I 
TELEGRAPHY, TELESCOPES & LANGUAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
COGNITIVE COMMITMENTS 
In the early 19th century, persistent operative hermeneutic analogies between the 
enteric nervous system and electric telegraphy were manifold, as the scientific 
study of organic and technological communications systems inspired one another. 
For instance, in the first decade of the nineteenth century, scientist M. 
Vorselmann de Heer’s account of an “electro-physiological telegraph” was 
founded upon the employment of shocks, where the passage of an electric current 
brought about a signal response in the fingers of an observer.1 In 1849, German 
physiologist Emil DuBois-Reymond based his description of excitation in nerves 
and muscles on Michael Faraday's experimentation on induction in electric 
circuits, drawing a parallel between the operations of the nervous system and the 
electrical telegraph.2 During the mid-1860s, mathematical engineer and physicist 
William Thomson mapped telegraph wires to his own tongue so as to "taste” the 
differences between signals.3 Emphasizing the physiological facet of these 
artificial communication systems allotted for the subject to serve as a kind of 
"receiving device," whereby cognition served as a patterning program. As 
Friedrich Kittler’s remarks in Discourse Networks make clear, nineteenth-century 
media for writing and communication (e.g., the telegraph, typewriter, 
phonograph and telephone) were considered to not only be directly imbued with 
modes of inscription and reception but also to affect how we conceive of 
cognition—the body's sensory organs were regarded as signal-processing systems, 
themselves.4  
In the foreword of Discourse Networks, David E. Wellbery makes a rather telling 
and somewhat disturbing remark, albeit one in line with the Derridean treatment 
of language. Wellbery notes that, according to Kittler’s account:  
“[o]ne way of formulating the discursive effect of psychophysics and the typewriter 
is to say that only with them does language become perceptible as a medium. But 
 
1 George Prescott, History, Theory and Practice of the Electric Telegraph, Boston, Ticknor and Fields, 1866, p. 56. 
2 Emil Du Bois-Reymond, On Animal Electricity, London, Forgotten Books, 2018. 
3 Hermann von Helmholtz, Science and Culture: Popular and Philosophical Essays, ed. David Cahan, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 150. 
4 Friedrich A. Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900, trans. Michael Metteer, Stanford, Stanford University 
Press, 1990, p. 187. 
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it is not the medial technology of the typewriter alone that makes this perception 
possible. The development of this technology around 1900 is co-emergent with 
other medial technologies, in particular the gramophone and film."5  
Wellbery goes on to underscore that each one of these aforementioned media 
comport to one of Lacan’s registers: writing conveys differences pertaining to the 
symbolic order; cinema, due to its Peircean indexicality of environmental 
simulation, transmits imaginary contents through visual presence; and the 
phonograph allows for the technical recording of the real.6 Nonetheless, there is 
also another less markedly pronounced understanding of language entangled in 
this remark. That, for Kittler, the materiality of language is foundational for its 
comprehension—or, at the very least, that language’s materiality brings about a 
more recognizable register of semantic engagement—and that language, much 
like media artefacts, is an evolutive scaffolding for self-reflective complexity that 
finds its ultimate original point of reference in itself. That is, semantics does not 
emerge out of the interaction of minimal syntactic rules or confrontation with 
basic axiomatic acts but, instead, from techniques of inscription. Before these 
inscriptions, language is but unrecognizably formulated and language, in and of 
itself, is not formalizable in the same way that these machines are. 
Kittler’s fleeting treatment of language is almost identical to Derrida’s,7 for 
whom “writing machines” like the stylus and typewriter reveal an inner kinetic 
condition with distinct ontological implications. Both machines direct language’s 
oriented structure towards not only the machine’s ability to materially inscribe 
time but also to extend intention. For Derrida, language and intentionality 
necessarily emerged in unison, with language materializing from what he calls 
“nonlanguage,”8 by which it would appear he means a language without 
 
5 David E. Wellbery, “Foreword” in Discourse Networks, p. 31. 
6 Ibid. 
7 This is despite Kittler’s general genealogical engagement with media qua contingency is thoroughly 
Foucauldian. 
8 "Why is it a nonlanguage, therefore? It is a nonlanguage because it evokes the future without predicting 
it. In other words it remembers the unknown without knowing it; or it recollects the unforeseeable without 
foreseeing it; that is why it is a remembrance which is not, a foreseeing which is not, a language with is not 
[....] it recalls what never happened, it evokes the inexperienced of experience [....] It is a language without 
'tenses' and 'cases', without predicates and without subject.” Branka Arsić, "Active Habits and Passive 
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constatives and operatives—the first utterance that has no previous history and, 
thus, is the initial hermeneutic provocation, i.e., the first media.9 
Contra Kittler and Derrida, this paper will claim that, despite us language-
bearers do not have direct access to reality, the conceptual realism required for 
knowledge to be intelligible is instituted by our attitudes and practices that 
inferentially reference a pragmatism about semantics which is inherently bound 
by our determinate status as belief-committed and conscious social organisms. 
This is not to dismiss media artefacts’ engagement with normative content and 
semantics but to preface media artefacts’ ontic status with a more formative 
understanding of “representation,” wherein “representation” designates a 
modern concept introduced to reconceive of the relation between reality and 
appearance. “Representation” here presents an alternative model to the 
“resemblance model” that characterized pre-modern philosophy’s designation of 
correspondence between how things really are and how they appear in terms of the 
phenomenal properties or qualities that the two share in a suitable manner. For 
example, in the “resemblance model” a picture of a tree is assumed to constitute 
a “veridical” appearance of trees in general iff they both share the same colors, 
relative proportions, shapes and so on. With Descartes’ conception of a mathesis 
universalis, however we see the resemblance model undone10—this mathesis 
universalis is not only a metaphysical model for understanding nature but an 
epistemological model for articulating mental states and the world.11  
With this new model, we could approach the relation between appearance and 
reality though the distinction between mental representings and physical representeds (as 
indexed by algebra and geometry, respectively). Representings function to mentally 
 
Events or Bartleby" in Between Deleuze and Derrida, eds. P. Patton and J. Portevia, London, A&C Black, 2003, 
p. 155. 
9 Derrida therefore identifies the Egyptian trickster character, Theuth, with the mythopoetic emergence of 
writing and, thus, as the progenitor of history. Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s pharmacy” in Dissemination, trans. 
B. Johnson, London, Athlone Press, 1981, pp. 61-117. 
10 Descartes’ model of “representation” was directly inspired by Galileo’s insight that the physical world 
could be mathematically conceived, mapping temporal duration to the length of lines and the acceleration 
of bodies to the area of triangles. 
11 Daniel Sacilotto, "Realism and Representation on the Ontological Turn" in Speculations IV: A Journal of 
Speculative Realism, eds. M. Austin, P. J. Ennis, F. Gironi, T. Gokey, R. Jackson, Santa Barbara, punctum 
books, 2013, pp. 55-56. 
 EKIN ERKAN 129 
 
“represent” the structural features of spatial figures, even if no resemblance 
obtains between the algebraic formulae and geometric properties of extended 
physical figures. In turn, it is not media’s extension or physical properties that 
matter for the relation between representing expressions and represented entities in space 
and time; this relationship is directed according to a structural isomorphy that 
algebraic symbols share holistically with spatial figures and their transformations. 
As Robert Brandom notes, “the context of such an isomorphism, the particular 
material properties of what now become intelligible as representings and representeds 
become irrelevant to the semantic relation between them,”12 for all that is 
significant is the correlation between the rules that govern the manipulation of 
representings and the real-world possibilities that characterize representeds.  
§ II 
SEMANTIC STRUCTURE & COMMITMENTS 
Clearly inspired by Brandom’s inferentialism, this paper stakes the claim that the 
intelligibly of “what we know” is predicated upon the conceptual form objects 
have for thought, which represents the way they are “in-themselves.” This is not 
a direct claim about being in and of itself but, instead, navigates media objects 
and cognition, as well as their coupled status, in order to progress a 
transcendental and, indeed, semantic claim about what it means to "know" or be 
conscious of, something. Furthermore, we will also try to illuminate the Hegelian 
plexus through which action-enjoining contexts implicitly determine the 
conceptual content that enjoins media-as-representings to laws of nature and 
formalized computable semantics.13 
 
12 Robert Brandom, A Spirit of Trust, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2019, pp. 39-40. 
13 “In response to the skeptical conclusions of rationalist and empiricist epistemologies, Hegel’s attack against 
the so-called ‘instrument-or-medium conception of reason’ disputes the claim that mind-independent reality 
is known only as mediated through our representings, and in doing rejected not only Humean skepticism 
concerning knowledge of what exceeds the sphere of sensory presentation, but also the Kantian difference 
between knowable phenomena and unknowable noumena, which introduced a gulf of intelligibility between 
appearances and reality. In short, Hegel does not take issue with the representationalist idea that 
mathematical formulae may stand in isomorphic relations to spatio-temporal phenomena, but disagrees 
with the skepticism that makes the possibility of knowledge of things as they are ‘in themselves’ 
unintelligible.” Robert Brandom, Spirit of Trust, p. 191. 
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Brandom replaces Wilfrid Sellars' primal semantic concerns regarding the 
theory of meaning (i.e., what it means to understand a proposition) with 
pragmatic questions. Thus, Brandom redirects our concern to what an 
interpreter does when engaging with speech statements "p" that are embedded 
with truth-value (and, in turn, belief). That is, the interpreter ascribes a kind of 
commitment to the speaker to justify their statement "p" where the interpreter 
takes a position regarding this truth claim, as they ascribe or deny the speaker an 
entitlement to assert this "p." In turn, Brandom engages with the supposition of 
rationality underlying such discursive activity. 
There is a presupposition here about our expressive rationality—that we are 
essentially normative beings due to our capacity to commit and concern ourselves 
with cognitive commitments or practical commitments regarding how things 
“shall be” in the conditional future. As discursive beings, our normativity is 
inferentially articulated, as we are either implicitly or explicitly asking and giving 
reasons for our commitments. The normative dimension and rational dimension 
are what, in turn, set us humans apart from other language-bearers, with logic 
and philosophy making that which is implicit in these practices explicit.14 
What does inferentialism, as such, have to do with mediation and with media 
objects? Answering the first part of this question is much more straightforward. 
Brandom’s approach to evaluating a being’s sapience through the Game Of 
Giving and Asking For Reasons (GOGAR) illuminates an engagement with the 
prototypical representation of social practice. Thus, inferentialism makes it 
possible to evaluate a being’s sapience simply by their nature of participation 
within that game qua reinforcement. In fact, this paradigm can be likened to a 
Strong AI semblance configured by Markov Decision-Processes, with state 
transition probabilities and reward values designating reinforcement-style 
behavior. Decisions, for Brandom, involve the ability to draw inferences and, in 
consequence, involve a contact with logic (a kind of practical mediation that 
involves a relation with a noumenal Outside, which in this case involves norms).15 
 
14 Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1994. 
15 Mediation in this sense involves the deployment of inferences, as in scenarios of commitment to something 
that is inferred but not immediately available as a perceptible. “For example, if someone is presented with 
an offer of employment, they have the option of signing it and taking the job. To take this all important 
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Normative vocabulary accordingly is not drawn upon in articulating the 
scientific image of things as they "really are." Normative vocabulary belongs 
exclusively to the manifest image. However, the questions addressed by the 
language of the ordinary lifeworld (i.e., the language of the manifest image) that 
is deployed in discursive practice also administers vocabulary that describes and 
explains the world, appealing to the realm of science (scientia mensura). This 
concerns the relations between descriptions and explanations "whose home is in 
the manifest image and those whose home is in the scientific image."16 So what 
Sellars designates as “methodological” and Brandom as “observational” is, 
seemingly, open to epistemic mediation, which is opposed to its static ontological 
status. There are different concerns in regards to how we know something rather 
than the kind of thing that we know about. Purely theoretical objects, for instance, 
are epistemically accessible to us only by means of inference while observable 
objects are also epistemically accessible via non-inferential reports. We can 
mediate the status of a methodological object:  
"[w]hen Pluto was first postulated, it was as a theoretical entity which we could 
know only by making inferences from perturbations in the orbit of Neptune. With 
improvements in telescopy, looking at the calculated position of the hypothetical 
planetoid yielded the first observations of Pluto. It became, for the first time, 
observable. But it did not change its ontological status; only its relation to us 
changed."17 
Media objects as such are subject in accordance to beliefs in the pragmatic 
mode, where they index a shared point of view in regards to sociality. What we 
do when we understand each other is, in turn, a matter of understanding what we 
are committed to and entitled to in order to hold these aforementioned 
 
decision, a rational being might consider all the consequences of signing that offer, for example, having to 
wake up 6 a.m. every weekday, being able to earn money. Thus, this interaction of signing the offer might 
be imagined to be an input-output relation where the input is the presentation of the offer, and the output 
is signing it. Although both simple performer and rational beings can take part in this interaction with the 
help of their abilities, what sets rational beings apart is the ability to draw inferences as a consequence of 
the output action.” Arisha Sarkar, “A Brandom-ian view of Reinforcement Learning towards strong-AI,” 
2018. 
16 Robert Brandom, From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars, Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press, 2014, p. 8. 
17 Robert Brandom, From Empiricism to Expressivism, pp. 59-60. 
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commitments. When we speak of, debate and exchange our Pluto-beliefs, we are 
tethered to those media instruments from which we draw our commitments. In 
order to articulate ourselves in those "I-thou relations" from which we build up a 
social structure, rather than “I-we relation” terms (i.e., the community and “we” 
in the community), there is no demand that we agree in all of our positions. 
Instead, the demand is that "you" know what “I” am committed to and keep track, 
or “keep score,” of what “I” am committed. Here, “I-thou relations” (or “I-you 
relations”) index the relations between a first-person speaker committed to the 
truth of a statement and a third person who ascribes a truth claim to the other 
while reserving their own judgment. We will examine how media artefacts play 
a position in such “score-keeping,” particularly as it relates to belief and desire. 
The act of ascription is fundamental to the whole practice of discourse as 
such, which object-ifies the second person into an observed third person.18 
Indeed, Brandom equates the interpreter with a public that judges utterances of 
an observed speaker, dissolving the internal relation between objectivity and 
intersubjectivity to favor the priority of the object-ive. As a consequence, the 
individual in question (i.e., “I”) is able to achieve a kind of epistemic 
independence from the collective authority of a respective language community, 
but they are tied back into linguistic communication vis-a-vis their beliefs and 
practical attitudes, or how they mediate their language with action and revisal. 
Media objects have allowed for us to deontically "keep score" throughout 
history, i.e. to understand one another by entangling social structure. Because the 
scientific image emerged within the manifest image, media allows for a 
reapproprative change in observables and the descriptive terms of the scientific 
image. By virtue of such specialized forms of “deontic scorekeeping,” agents 
mutually assess their beliefs and revise concepts through specific cultural methods 
and techniques. Following the rudimentary tenet of weak empiricism, we do not 
know anything about the world around us without sensory experience but the 
form of the conceptual is an inferential form; to be conceptually contentful is to 
be inferentially articulated. In the game of giving and asking for reasons, an 
observer’s response is conceptually contentful solely insofar as it occupies a node 
 
18 Jürgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2008. 
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in a web of inferential relations.19 The question, in turn, turns to how reliable 
causal connections come to be inferentially used in the world. As sentient beings, 
we reliably respond to the world around us and these can be tracked inferentially: 
so, for instance, if “I” take “you” to be a reliable observer of “red things” it is 
because “I” am prepared to infer from your claiming that an object is red that it is, 
indeed, red. This is a reliability-inference where the causal connection between you 
and red-things is put into an inferential form whereby what you are 
saying/undertaking is a commitment that gives me reason to undertake a 
commitment. This gives us a way to inferentially track reliable commitments in 
the world. Media artefacts of reference can either shortcut or take the place of 
these verbal commitments by memorializing ordinary language, in a sense; as in 
the example of the telescope, however, they also affect ontic commitments. For 
Brandom, norms are transcendental insofar as they occupy a functional role that 
determines the content of a concept that can be instantiated across indefinitely 
varied linguistic and cognitive hosts.20 
In turn, we will progress to exercise the methodologies of classical 
genealogy—a rich tradition stoked by Nietzsche and one that continues quite 
robustly in both the analytic and continental philosophical traditions but is often 
blindsided when it comes to considerations related to philosophy of mind. 
Furthermore, certain traditions of media philosophy almost unequivocally accept 
the aforementioned Derridean-Kittlerian rendering of language as coming to 
form through media. However, subtracted from representation, these media 
objects occupy the ontic status of metalanguage, insofar as they make explicit the 
ontological, descriptive content laden within the manifold of communicability 
which is absent from these accounts. 
In resisting the Derridean-Kittlerian treatment, we by no means contend with 
passive synthesis—that norms are passively constituted and we do not actively 
 
19 Robert Brandom, From Empiricism to Expressivism, p. 192. 
20 “Norms (in the sense of normative statuses) are not objects in the causal order. Natural science, eschewing 
categories of social practice, will never run across commitments in its cataloguing of the furniture of the 
world; they are not by themselves causally efficacious—no more than strikes or outs are in baseball. 
Nonetheless, according to the account presented here, there are norms, and their existence is neither 
supernatural nor mysterious. Normative statuses are domesticated by being understood in terms of 
normative attitudes, which are in the causal order.” Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit, p. 626. 
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shape them via jurisprudence, media, politics and so on. On the contrary, and as 
Heidegger points out, there is a critical problem that disrupts the interface 
between the transcendental aesthetic and the analytic, as was made evident with 
Kant’s difficulty in coordinating the receptivity of intuition with the 
conceptualizing activity of the understanding in grounding metaphysics.21 
“[I]ntuition is not purely passive, but seems already productive, individuating the 
forms of space and time and ‘guiding us’ before cognition under judgment.”22 
Without the subject’s active contribution through the endowments of sensibility—
that is, mediation proper (as in structuring language)—cognition only would be 
but a formless inconsistency. Intuition as such isn’t just a “sensory manifold” of 
raw data, but that which grounds our pre-discursive representation of individuals 
that is represented in our empirical cognitions, formulating the objects of our 
perceptual judgments. 
Drawing from Brandom’s historical summary of epistemological grounding 
and practical commitments, we can take note of how the formative project of 
semantic analysis attempts to clarify the relation between theory and observation 
in terms of how certain target vocabularies can be considered to be logical 
elaborations of some base vocabulary. How, then, can target media objects be 
considered as the semantic elaborations of some basic logic of syntax? 
§ III 
TRUTH & BELIEF 
In Alfred Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, we see the revitalization of a 
conception of correspondence that is in conformity with the classical Aristotelian 
understanding of truth, wherein there are enactive underlying pragmata that 
structure the truth-value of statements.23 As a consequence, to “say of what is that 
 
21 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. R. Taft, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 
1997, p. 161. 
22 Daniel Sacilotto, Saving the Noumenon, 2020, ed. N. Brown, p. 101. (Manuscript in preparation.) 
23 “To prove that A does not belong to every B, we must suppose that it belongs to every B; for if A belongs 
to every B, and C to every A, then C belongs to every B; so that if this is impossible, the supposition is false. 
Similarly if the other proposition assumed concerns B. The same results if CA is negative; for thus also we 
get a deduction. But if the negative concerns B, nothing is proved. If the supposition is that A belongs not 
to every but to some B, it is not proved that A belongs not to every B, but that it belongs to no B. For if A 
belongs to some B, and C to every A, then C will belong to some B. If then this is impossible, it is false that 
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it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, or of 
what is not that it is not, is true.”24 According to Tarski, both the laws of 
contradiction and of the excluded middle can be deduced from this formula. In 
Tarski’s definition of truth of an interpreted sentence, a sentence A is true iff A is 
satisfied by every infinite sequence of objects; for Tarski, because truth is not 
relative to circumstances, if A is a variable-free sentence utilized within a kind of 
formalized interpreted language, either all sequences satisfy A, or no sequence 
satisfies A. In turn Tarski’s absolute concept of truth determines that every 
sentence is true or false under all circumstances.25  
As a result, for Tarski there is a metalanguage carrying assumptive axioms 
that is richer than our object language. A truth definition needs to be formally 
correct in the sense that the metalanguage in which the definition is given is 
richer than the object language and it is also to be “materially adequate.” By 
“materially adequate,” Tarski means that “its consequences [should] include all 
those required by this convention.”26 Such a formulation expresses a concept of 
absolute truth wherein the truth of a sentence is not restricted to a certain domain 
or circumstances. Accordingly, since truth is not relative to circumstances and in 
order to bar the emergence of logic of the liar-like paradoxes, Tarski suggests that 
 
A belongs to some B; consequently it is true that A belongs to no B. But if this is proved, the truth is refuted 
as well; for the original conclusion was that A belongs to some B, and does not belong to some B. Further 
nothing impossible results from the supposition; for then the supposition would be false, since it is impossible 
to deduce a false conclusion from true premises; but in fact it is true; for A belongs to some B. Consequently 
we must not suppose that A belongs to some B, but that it belongs to every B. Similarly if we should be 
proving that A does not belong to some B; for if not to belong to some and to belong not to every are the 
same, the demonstration of both will be identical.” Aristotle, Priori Analytics: Book II in The Complete Works of 
Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991, p. 72, 61b34-62a10. 
24 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. W. D. Ross, Sioux Falls, NuVision Publications, 2009, §1011b25. 
25 Maria van der Schaar, "Truth and Time. Twardowski’s Impact on his Students" in Kazimierz Twardowski: 
A Grammar for Philosophy, Leiden, Brill, 2015, p. 129. 
26 Alfred Tarski, “The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages” in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, trans. 
J.H. Woodger, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1956, pp. 152-278. The Tarskian model-theoretic semantic frame 
can be generalized as and used “without distortion and as a fundamental concept in all of the disciplines 
from which the above quotations are drawn. In this sense I would assert that the meaning of the concept of 
model is the same in mathematics and the empirical sciences. The difference to be found in these disciplines 
is to be found in their use of the concept.” In drawing this comparison between constancy of meaning and 
difference of use, a semantical question arises in how to explain the meaning of a concept without referring 
to its technical context. Patrick Suppes, Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science, New York, Springer, 
2012, pp. 165-166. 
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a given theory should not contain its own truth-predicate. Accordingly, “the truth-
predicate of a language L1 would only be expressible in a language L2, whose own 
truth-predicate would be expressible in a higher-order language L3, and so forth. 
Thus, with Tarski, the object-level v. meta-level distinction itself became 
formalized.”27 For Tarski, the domain of intended application according to which 
any theory’s “core” becomes coordinated is in regards to tracking a specific sector 
of the (possible) world that relies on already-available concepts and vocabularies. 
These given concepts and vocabularies describe the relevant ontological 
categorial status assigned to the data-basis of a theory.28 
According to this position, a Tarskian theory of truth, we have a firm 
referential grip of truth-conditions and how they structurally relate to the 
inferential policies we apply to propositions. Therefore, “logical relations are 
subject to uniform treatment: they are invariant with subject matter” and “they 
help define the concept of ‘subject matter.’”29 That is, logical relations define 
subject matter, such that those very same rules of inference both can be and are 
accounted for by the same theory which provides us with our ordinary account 
of inference. 
Following Tarski’s doctrine, our physical claims experience no difficulties in 
aligning themselves with exterior truth-values despite mathematics cannot tie its 
own references to causal bonds. Physical vocabulary gleans inferential and 
referential credence in a direct manner, utilizing an appeal to truth-conditionings 
that is entirely based on component-decompositional policies of reference-
linkage. Given Tarski’s conception of language, there is something of an 
inferential extension at play. This stripe of Tarski-style soundness proofs of the 
external world support a simple predicate-to-extension picture.30 Indeed, Tarski’s 
inferential warrants are always provisional, hostage to the consideration that they 
may rest upon a faulty picture of how physical information is actually encoded 
 
27 Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Formal Languages in Logic: A Philosophical and Cognitive Analysis, Cambridge, UK, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 87. 
28 Thus, “an element x of I is also a subclass of Mpp insofar as the latter provides the informational basis for 
a structural theory.” Daniel Sacilotto, Saving the Noumenon, p. 98.  
29 Alfred Tarski, “Mathematical Truth” in Philosophy of Mathematics, eds. P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam, 
Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 411. 
30 For a robust counterexample, see: Mark Wilson, Physics Avoidance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018. 
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within a descriptive language.31 
In Tarski’s infrastructure, the theoretical suppositions of logic are referentially 
equipollent to how language is formalized. What does it mean to formalize 
language and how does a formalized language present itself to us? One answer 
recalls Carnap’s description of how the process of abstraction and the resulting 
purely formal system that is obtained can be qualified as “formal” or attributed 
with “formalization”: 
“[a] theory, a rule, a definition, or the like is to be called formal when no reference 
is made in it either to the meaning of the symbols (for example, the words) or to the 
sense of the expressions (e.g., the sentences), but simply and solely to the kinds and 
order of the symbols from which the expressions are constructed.”32 
Recalling our previous discussion of normativity, Carnap’s claim can be 
extended such that the irreducible normative dimension associated with sapient 
cognition is liable to mathematical distillation, in an information-theoretic and 
computationalist register. Carnap’s thesis is that science deals solely with the 
description of the structural properties of objects. Consequently, this thesis hinges 
on the practicability of demonstrating the possibility of a formal constructional 
system that contains all objects within one single principle. Carnap’s reduction 
can be extended, in turn, to reducing the entirety of phenomenal reality to 
perceptual experience along the lines of a deductive model of reduction.33 
However, the purpose of these Carnapian reductions are “not ontological in the 
sense of showing that the physical facts or facts about perception are exhaustive 
of all the facts.”34 Instead, Carnap’s reducibility is a kind of transformative 
reduction, an interdefinability. Nowhere is this clearer than with Carnap’s work 
on fractions and natural numbers. For Carnap, those statements that deal with 
fractions can be readily transformed into statements concerning natural numbers 
without losing content. Carnap’s account of reductions as transformations or 
logical constructions is clearly stated in his intent to create a universal system of 
relations, wherein: 
 
31 Ibid., p. 419. 
32 Rudolph Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language, London, Open Court, 1934, p. 1.  
33 This is why Carnap’s Universal Learning Machine is sometimes termed a Universal Optical Machine 
34 John Symons, “Ontology and Methodology in Analytic Philosophy” in Theory and Applications of Ontology, 
New York, Springer, 2010, p. 366. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 138 
 
“[t]o reduce a to b, c or to construct a out of b, c means to produce a general rule that 
indicates for each individual case how a statement about a must be transformed in 
order to yield a statement about b, c. This rule of translation we call a construction 
rule or constructional definition.”35 
Hilary Putnam explicitly assumed the view that ‘‘the task of inductive logic is 
the construction of a ‘universal learning machine’’’ and committed to 
demonstrating the impossibility of this notion with his diagonal proof of the 
incompatibility for confirmation functions.36 For Putnam:  
“[c]ertainly it appears implausible to say that there is a rule whereby one can go 
from the observational facts [...] to the observational prediction without any 
‘detour’ into the realm of theory [….] this is a consequence of the supposition that 
degree of confirmation can be ‘adequately defined’; i.e. defined in such a way as to 
agree with the actual inductive judgements of good and careful scientists. We get 
the further consequence that it is possible in principle to build an electronic 
computer such that, if it could somehow be given all the observational facts, it 
would always make the best prediction—i.e. the prediction that would be made by 
the best possible scientist if he had the best possible theories. [According to 
Carnap’s program] Science could in principle be done by a moron (or an electronic 
computer).”37 
What Putnam sought to show via his diagonalization argument is that there 
cannot be a learning machine which is also universal—that is, there can be no 
universal inductive method that is effectively computable which is also able to 
eventually detect any pattern that is effectively computable.38 
Independently from Putnam, Ray Solomonoff, a student of Carnap’s, 
presented a formal solution to derivability in the language of Carnap by 
 
35 Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World, Chicago, Open Court Publishing, 2003, p. 6. 
36 Hilary Putnam, “Probability and confirmation” in The voice of America forum lectures, U.S. Information 
Agency, Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 293-304.  
37 Hilary Putnam, Mathematics, Matter and Method: Volume 1, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press 
Archive, 1975, p. 290. 
38 According to Putnam, "we may think of a system of inductive logic as a design for a ‘learning machine’: 
that is to say, a design for a computing machine that can extrapolate certain kinds of empirical regularities 
from the data with which it is supplied" and "‘if there is such a thing as a correct ‘degree of confirmation’ 
which can be fixed once and for all, then a machine which predicted in accordance with the degree of 
confirmation would be an optimal, that is to say, a cleverest possible learning machine.” Putnam asserts that 
his diagonal proof would show that there can be no such thing: it is ‘‘an argument against the existence—
that is, against the possible existence—of a ‘cleverest possible’ learning machine.’” Hilary Putnam, 
“Probability and confirmation,” p. 299. 
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rendering problems of inductive inference whether they involve discrete or 
continuous data (or both) as being able to be expressed in the form of the 
extrapolation of a long sequence of symbols. This formalized solution designates 
a mathematical equation that expresses the probability of a hypothesis’ being 
degree-confirming as a function of the sequences involved. In particular, the 
solutions that Solomonoff proposed involve Baye's Theorem, insofar as:  
"[a] priori probabilities are assigned to strings of symbols by examining the manner 
in which these strings might be produced by a universal Turing machine. Strings 
with short and/or numerous ‘descriptions’ (a ‘description’ of a string being an input 
to the machine that yields that string as output) are assigned high a priori 
probabilities. Strings with long, and/or few descriptions are assigned small a priori 
probabilities.”39  
In the Logical Foundations of  Probability, Carnap subverts the probabilistic 
paradigms of Humean induction garrisoned by observational data, whereby 
every form of induction is based on an observable pattern, the very paradigm for 
deep neural networks. In Carnap’s inductive pattern-matching unification, we are 
introduced to a unique conception of reflective analyticity that is entirely distinct 
from Kant’s. Carnap’s insistence on a logical index substantiates that logical 
atomism is primary and observation secondary—at a fundamental level, 
probability or statistics cannot bear an ontological terra firma until they are 
couched in terms of logical relationships.40  
As an inversion of Huffman coding, Solomonoff ’s strategy first obtains the 
minimal code for a string and, from this code, obtains the probability of that 
string in question. Solomonoff ’s setting is, thus, entirely within the scope of 
Putnam’s diagonalization argument. The crux of Solomonoff ’s strategy is that we 
translate a symbol sequence of length t into the observation of the first t 
individuals. The notion of effective computability, a function of homogenized 
 
39 Ray Solomonoff, “A Formal Theory of Inductive Inference, Pt. I” Information and Control, vol. 7, 1964, p. 
3.  
40 Despite Carnap’s antipathy for Hegel, his insistence on logical isomorphism corresponds directly to the 
premise of Hegel’s historical program. Hegel’s history is that of sequencing forms and division (whether it 
be subjective spirit’s relationship to psychology, objective spirit’s relationship to institutions of the state, or 
absolute spirit’s relationship to art/theology/philosophy), such that each sequence set realizes a higher level 
of development and then decays as their internal contradictions became apparent and their unique 
potentials have been exhausted. 
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formalization, is what set Solomonoff ’s program apart from Carnap’s. 
Recently, Tom F. Sterkenburg has revived the prospects of Solomonoff–
Levin’s mathematical proposal regarding Carnap's optimum universal inductive 
machine. Sterkenburg has stressed that the Solomonoff–Levin measure manages 
to successfully unite versions of Putnam’s two adequacy conditions—1) M 
converges on any true computable hypothesis; 2) M is computable—by involving 
a weakened notion of effective computability. However, in investigating the 
possibility of a perfectly general and purely mechanical rule for extrapolating 
data, Sterkenburg’s position clashes with Putnam’s philosophical supposition that, 
in fact, ‘‘there is no universal algorithm’’ for inductive purposes by effectively 
obtaining universalizable events.41  
Using transformations by functions that are effectively computable allows 
Sterkenburg to modify functions to transform along finite sequences and 
therefore impose the property of computability. Sterkenburg attempts to 
construct a monotone machine, drawing from Carnap's program by resurrecting 
the notion of a universal mechanical rule for induction that can be visualized as 
operating on a steady stream of input symbols, producing an (in)finite output 
sequence in the process. Sterkenburg's attempts to identify a natural class of 
effective elements that are immune to diagonalization but, ultimately, is unable 
to locate a natural class of effective functions that cannot be diagonalized, i.e., 
that contains universal elements.  
Unlike Kripke’s distinction between analyticity and metaphysical necessity, 
Carnap's conception of modal logic and intentional semantics collapses 
intentional content in its treatment of quantifiers as ranging over objects. Despite 
Sterkenburg’s commendable analysis, his program is unable to universalize 
universal elements into optimal inductive rules. Just as Carnap takes L-truth to 
be a semantic concept that explicates the informal convention of designating a 
sentence logically true iff the sentence is true in virtue of semantic rules without 
reference, it would similarly appear that the entire conceptual prospect of first-
order modal predicate semantics (i.e., modal functional logic) is not 
axiomatizable into a functional calculus of substitution.  
 
41 Tom F. Sterkenburg, "Putnam’s Diagonal Argument and the Impossibility of a Universal Learning 
Machine," Erkenntnis, vol. 84, no. 3, 2019, pp. 633-656. 
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According to Sellars, Carnap’s definitional construction of transformation 
rules elides normative terms and their force, such that this definitional schema 
for transformation can not capture the normative content of rules implied by 
terms such as “ought” or “ought not”—rather, Carnap’s program accounts solely 
for relational terms instead of properly construed definitions. More specifically, 
the first prong of Sellars’ twofold critique of Carnap deals with normativity. 
Sellars’s second, and closely related critique, takes Carnap to task for the absence 
of reference to actions in his rule schema. Sellars makes the assertion that:  
"a rule is always a rule for doing something [....] any sentence which is to be the 
formulation of a rule must mention a doing or action. It is the performance of this 
action (in specified circumstances) which is enjoined by the rule, and which carries 
the flavour of ought.”42  
That is, for a rule to function as a rule, proper, instead of a mere 
generalization, it must be internal to an action, such that the rule-regulated 
behavior in question occurs due to the rule and not simply in conformity with it. 
For instance, take Carnap's notion of "arrestable." Even if Carnap's schemata are 
able to capture the action-based quality of rules in definiendum, they can still fail 
to capture a general rule—"arrestable" as such fails to be transferred over to 
definiens from definiendum such that it may specify the circumstance in which a 
person is “arrestable” but does not capture the general rule for “arresting” 
someone. Accordingly, Carnap's definitional schema does not give any accurate 
definition for what counts as a linguistic rule.43  
Thus, for Sellars: 
“[a] rule is always a rule for doing something in some circumstance. 
And a rule is the sort of thing that one follows. But following a rule 
entails recognizing that a circumstance is one to which the rule 
 
42 Wilfrid Sellars, "Language and Meaning" in In the Space of Reasons: Selected Essays of Wilfrid Sellars, 
Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 18. 
43 “Carnap's claim that he is giving a definition of "directly derivable in S" is a snare and a delusion. It is as 
though one offered the following "definition" as a formulation of a basic rule governing the activities of 
policemen: "X is arrestable =DF X has broken a law". It is obvious that such a definition would be a mistake 
not only because the definiendum "arrestable" has, as we saw, a normative force not shared by the definiens, 
but also, because it designates an act, the act of arresting, which is not designated by the definiens.” Wilfrid 
Sellars, “Inference and Meaning” in In the Space of Reasons, eds. K Scharp and R. Brandom, Cambridge, 
MA, Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 19. 
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applies. If there were such a thing as a semantical rule by the adoption 
of which a descriptive term acquires meaning, it would presumably 
be of the form “Red objects are to be designated by the word 'red.' " 
But to recognize the circumstances in which this rule has application, 
one must already have the concept of red! Those who speak in this 
sense of semantical rules, therefore, are committed to the view that 
an awareness of abstract entities is a precondition of learning the 
intelligent use of symbols.”44  
Specifically, what Sellars is concerned with is the performance of an action 
which ties it to the rule and extends it into intention. Turning away from the logic 
of substitution, then—and, in turn, settling with the impossibility of a Carnapian 
program that effectively collapses language and computation—let us turn to 
material engagement. Having reviewed some of Carnap’s shortcomings, let us 
also retain a healthy bit of skepticism regarding theories of extended mind and 
embodied cognition that exact a reductive transformation which renders the 
perceptible function of memory as the representation of language without 
accounting for a normative theory of belief-formation. We will further detail this 
with David Chalmers and Andy Clark’s work on extended cognition. 
§ IV 
MATERIAL ENGAGEMENT & EXTENSION 
 According to Lambros Malafouris's Material Engagement Theory (MET), 
actions, objects and signs are, ontologically speaking, inseparable and our 
"mindscape" is constituted by bodily practices and via artefacts.45 Malafouris’ 
interest is not in, say, simply the lines we draw on paper, for instance, but also 
those "imaginary lines" that "connect our past with our present and possible 
future and allow us to become the self-conscious beings we are, [which] exist in 
the middle space where brain, body and culture conflate.”46 Never entirely 
mental, in the “internal” sense, and never just material, in the “external” sense—
 
44 Wilfrid Sellars, “Is There a Synthetic A Priori?,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 20, no. 2, 1953, p. 133. 
45 Lambros Malafouris, “Mind and Material Engagement,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, vol. 18, 
2019, pp. 1-17. 
46 Ibid., p. 4. 
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neither mind, in the cognitivist sense, nor matter in the materialist sense—MET 
suggests that the “enacted inside” of the world is based on cognitive commitments 
of material engagement qua epistemic constraints, wherein the materiality of 
mind is differentially extended. MET proposes that we can only extend human 
beings and what it is to be human by understanding modes of human cognitive 
“becoming,” or how human minds "become" at personal, peripersonal and 
extrapersonal temporal-spatial scales of engagement. Accordingly, what we call 
mind is a process constituted by the continuous recycling and re-organization of 
cognitive-artefactual thinking, which exists in a state of perpetual movement (i.e., 
“[m]inds never stop minding” and “[m]inds always become).”47 While this 
seemingly applies to every sentient organism, it is especially true in the case of 
humans given their profound plasticity and the diverse artefactual engagements 
of the material forms that we make.  
As an anthropologically-minded researcher of archeological development, 
Malafouris underscores the evolutionary progression relevant to the human 
ability to participate in collaborative activities with shared intentions. In 
particular, Malafouris draws attention to the linguistic facet of object-oriented 
processes of material engagement, illuminating relationships between 
technological change in the Early Stone Age (ESA) and underscoring evolving 
hominin brain size, functional lateralization and language capacities so as to 
support the argument that human brains and technology have been co-evolving 
for at least two million years. In particular, new imaging data shows that the 
neural circuits supporting stone toolmaking partially overlap with language 
circuits, which suggests that these behaviors share a primordial foundation in how 
goal-directed actions have evolved in a mutually reinforcing way.48 
Of course, MET is not the first theory of artefactual engagement and has 
historically developed from a lineage of theorists, anthropologists and 
philosophers concerned with behavioral automatization outpouching mental 
activity vis-à-vis habit. The most cited and perhaps most celebrated version of 
this is found in David Chalmers and Andy Clark’s Extended Mind (EM) 
 
47 Ibid., p. 5. 
48 Dietrich Stout and Thierry Chaminade, “The evolutionary neuroscience of tool making,” Neuropsychologia, 
vol. 45, 2007, pp. 1091-1100. 
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argument. Chalmers and Clark reference the ascriptions of extended beliefs vis-
à-vis media mnemonics that are automatically consulted by way of a case study: 
a man named Otto. Otto suffers from Alzheimer's disease and, like many 
Alzheimer's patients, he relies on information environmentally embedded in 
order to structure his life. One of the critical examples that Chalmers and Clark 
recall is Otto’s notebook:  
“Otto carries a notebook around with him everywhere he goes. When he learns 
new information, he writes it down. When he needs some old information, he looks 
it up. For Otto, his notebook plays the role usually played by a biological 
memory.”49  
Compared to Inga, who has a perfectly functioning memory, Otto’s notebook 
plays a role functionally akin to memory because the notebook is part of Otto’s 
cognitive process. Inga is attending the same exhibition opening as Otto at the 
Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) on 53rd st., between 5th and 6th ave., in 
Manhattan and walks to the museum using solely her memory. Otto travels to 
the opening by consulting the directions that he has jotted into his notebook. 
Nonetheless, it follows that both Inga and Otto both are operating according to 
belief. Respectively, Inga's memory and Otto's notebook combine desire (to go to 
the museum) with memory in order to produce action.  
According to Chalmers and Clark, Otto's notebook demonstrates a socially 
embodied relationship of reference, taking on the kind of ontic commitment-
based role elsewhere accounted for by social relationships. What, then, is to be 
said of the realization of belief(s)? Consider, for instance, the example that Clark 
and Chalmers give of the waiter at a regular patron’s favorite restaurant. The 
waiter who serves a patron the meal that they regularly request can act as a 
repository for the patron’s beliefs about their favorite meals and we can even 
account for this as a case of extended desire. The waiter is a cognitive collaborator 
with whom the patron is entangled in automatic endorsement; yet the 
information in question (directions, meal orders) has, at some previous point, 
been consciously endorsed, which is tacitly referenced in constructing implicit 
belief. Of course, such common kinds of collaborative belief-relationships often 
 
49 Andy Clark and David Chalmers, "The extended mind," Analysis, vol. 58, no.1, p.12. 
 EKIN ERKAN 145 
 
transpire between lovers, bosses and secretaries, co-workers and so on.50  
The important point is that a kind of meta-syntactical performance, i.e., a 
language, is being exchanged here. How do Clark and Chalmers designate that 
which is language? It is equipollent to extended articulation, such that media are 
syntactical elements because they allow for the coupling of various cognitive 
references. Without such a language, we become akin to those stripped Cartesian 
inner minds where higher-level cognition can solely rely on internal resources—
for instance, beliefs predicated upon mathematical inferences. According to 
Descartes’ mathematical opportunism, nature offers us restricted occasions 
wherein we can follow developing processes with reasoning tools, internally 
mentally mapping the possibility of an enlarged landscape through those 
reasoning procedures that occupy a computational stripe.51 However, language 
allows for this burden to be spread into the world of objects—language is no 
mirror of the inner Cartesian states of belief but allots for an ontic compliment. 
Language thus serves "as a tool whose role is to extend cognition in ways that on-
board devices cannot."52 
In a foreword to Andy Clark’s Supersizing the Mind, Chalmers recollects the 
mind’s offloading by recounting a recent purchase: 
“[a] month ago, I bought an iPhone. The iPhone has already taken over some of 
the central functions of my brain. It has replaced part of my memory, storing phone 
numbers and addresses that I once would have taxed my brain with. It harbors my 
desires: I call up a memo with the names of my favorite dishes when I need to order 
at a local restaurant. I use it to calculate, when I need to figure out bills and tips . . . 
Friends joke that I should get the iPhone implanted into my brain. But if Andy 
Clark is right, all this would do is speed up the processing and free up my hands. 
The iPhone is part of my mind already.”53 
While Otto’s notebook, Chalmers’ iPhone and Inga’s memorization 
apparently do not differ in terms of their participation in cognitive processes, 
there is a distinction linked to when and how offloaded memory is consulted. This 
distinction relies upon the facilitation of cognitive processes that would otherwise 
 
50 Ibid., p. 17. 
51 Mark Wilson, Physics Avoidance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 375.  
52 Andy Clark et al., "The extended mind," p. 18. 
53 Andy Clark, Supersizing the Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. ix. 
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have been autonomous. That is, in order for the extended cognition argument to 
verify that formal languages transform cognitive processes in non-trivial ways, 
there “must be more than incidental facilitation of cognitive processes which are 
otherwise essentially autonomous.”54 
Accordingly, Chalmers and Clark’s Parity Principle states that external 
devices do not merely facilitate cognitive tasks but are in fact constitutive of those 
cognitive operations in question; cognitive states and processes extend beyond 
the brain and into the external world when those relevant parts of the world 
function in the same way as do unquestionably cognitive processes in the mind. 
However, how are certain media objects differentiated? The notion of extended 
cognition is, by itself, arguably far too liberal, for it would account for all 
nonbiological artefacts that are utilized in any kind of momentary or occasional 
information-processing cognitive process, making the concept of “mind,” proper, 
elusive. Jeroen de Ridder accounts for a putative set of restrictions via the 
Modified Parity Principle.55 This further articulates a distinction derived from 
Chalmers and Clark’s criteria that an artefact must satisfy in order to qualify as 
part of a subject’s cognitive process:  
1) the resource must be reliably available to the subject and typically invoked 
in the relevant circumstances; it is a constant in the subject’s life;  
2) easy access: information in the resource should be accessible as and when 
needed, without difficulty;  
3) automatic endorsement: information retrieved from the resource must be 
automatically endorsed, deemed about as trustworthy as information 
retrieved from internal biological sources, and not usually be subject to 
critical scrutiny;  
4) past endorsement: the information in the resource has been consciously 
endorsed in the past and is there because of this endorsement.56 
 
54 Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Formal Languages in Logic, 2012, p. 182. 
55 According to the Modified Parity Principle, “if, as a group confronts some task, a part of the group’s life 
functions as a state which, were a state in the head of an individual to function similarly to it, we would have 
no hesitation in recognizing as a mental representation, then that part of the group’s life is a collective 
representation.” Jeroen de Ridder, “Representations and Robustly Collective Attitudes” in Socially Extended 
Epistemology, eds. A. Clark et al., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 49. 
56 Ibid. Andy Clark et al., "The extended mind," p. 17. 
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For Chalmers, in particular, information is conscious if it is reportable and 
that which is reportable directs how such information is occasioned for function.57 
In turn, it is critical that the correct kinds of internal representations meet the 
representations that qualify a necessary condition for having a belief (or some 
other representational attitude). The collective mental attitudes stipulated upon 
involve representations that can be further stratified between mental imagery and 
linguistic or conceptual structure. This is why and how aspects of our environment 
actively instantiate parts of our cognitive processes, rather than all elements of 
our environment being actively entangled. Specifically, Chalmers’ two-
dimensionalist theory of reference between primary intension (of sense) and a 
secondary intension (of referential assignment) is highly related to Carnap's 
logical empiricism, where existential questions (of desire and/or belief) are 
relative to the linguistic framework (embedded in the artefacts of the EM), or the 
set of rules governing the relevant terminology in which they are posed.  
If we wish to search for any operational syntactical metalanguage to take 
account of how our pragmatic questions are determined, our concern about how 
our choice of linguistic frameworks are retrofitted vis-à-vis confirmation will, as 
with Carnap, be neglected once again. Notably, Chalmers’ does not involve 
deferential concepts that are in part about rule-obeying behavior nor does 
Chalmers’ account require deferential thoughts that involve the concepts of 
“meaning”58 or “reference.”59 Rather it is a language of reference only insofar as 
 
57 David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 237. 
58 According to the instantiation of a metalanguage of meaning, one “must be thinking about the word 
‘narcolepsy’, when he is [falsely] entertaining the thought ‘narcolepsy is a disease of the nose’, if the term 
‘narcolepsy’ in that thought is equivalent to a metalinguistic description. This is doubtful for several reasons, 
including that the subject did not fix upon the words/labels themselves. When we entertain thoughts 
involving concepts whose reference we might consult an expert to decide, such as QUARK or 
NARCOLEPSY, it does not seem as though these thoughts are particularly different from thoughts that 
involve concepts that we fully grasp ourselves, such as HAND or UP. Thoughts involving deferential 
concepts don’t seem to stand out to us as being somehow thoughts about language.” Cathal O’Madagain, 
“Outsourcing Concepts: Social Externalism, the Extended Mind, and the Expansion of our Epistemic 
Capacity,” Socially Extended Epistemology, p. 24.  
59 “Young children, for example, might use many concepts deferentially—coming to believe that electricity 
is dangerous, or that the stove runs on gas, without having the ability to uniquely identify either electricity 
or gas. It seems highly doubtful that they should grasp the concepts MEANING or REFERENCE for this 
to take place, and yet on the metalinguistic account, such concepts must be playing a role in their deferential 
thoughts.” Ibid, p. 27. 
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it allows for semantic deference, or for entangled language to be adaptively 
pointed to certain artefacts/media objects as a functional articulation of their 
use-value, such that Otto’s notebook helps him consolidate the reference-words 
in his notebook—“Museum of Modern Art,” “6th ave.,” “53rd Street,” and so on—
in a step-oriented manner (i.e., directive planning). The paradigm of EM 
reasoning is beneficial in identifying cases of functional parity between cognitive 
states and object-oriented activities where no reflections on language are 
necessary at any stage in the employment of deferential concepts or rules. 
Therefore, co-opting the EM framework, deferential and non-deferential 
concepts differ solely at the level of the retrieval mechanism in play with 
underlying semantic knowledge: “for non-deferential concepts, that mechanism 
operates locally, while for deferential concepts that mechanism depends on 
information stored in other people’s minds.”60 
Without relying on the Parity Principle, philosophers who endorse the second 
wave of the EM theory such as Richard Menary consider extension in terms of 
integration. Despite abandoning the Parity Principle, second wave EM thinkers co-
opt the "complementarity principle," which rejects the notion that external 
factors must be functionally similar to conventional mental states and processes 
in order to qualify as “cognitive.” Rather, what is emphasized here is integration 
with biological systems and the “coordination” of a biological system to be 
hybridized (or “hominized”). So, to recall Chalmers and Clark’s MoMA example, 
Otto's notebook is not a “part” of Otto's mind because it functions exactly like 
Otto's memory used to. Instead, the notebook is coordinated and integrated with 
Otto’s mind because it engages in feedback loops with the biological brain during 
various episodes of cognition. For Menary and other such second wave 
proponents of EM, external elements are not mere "tools" for they can be 
reciprocally integrated with those minds that act upon them and are acted upon. 
Accordingly: 
“[o]ne way to understand integration is as follows: cognition is the coordination of 
bodily processes of the organism with salient features of the environment, often 
created or maintained by the organism. A coordinated process allows the organism 
to perform cognitive tasks that it otherwise would be unable to; or allows it to 
 
60 Ibid., p. 31. 
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perform tasks in a way that is distinctively different and is an improvement upon 
the way that the organism performs those tasks via neural processes alone.”61 
 The true advantage of this Complementarity Principle in comparison to the 
Parity Principle is that it allows its proponents to avoid the claim of extra-cranial 
and intra-cranial functional equivalency. Instead, the focus is on the increase in 
“computational power” offered by the involvement of “exograms” rather than on 
how they might truly modify and transform cognitive processes. In particular, it 
is John Sutton, a second wave EM advocate highly influenced by Merlin Donald, 
who underscores a distinction between “exograms,” or external symbols, and 
“engrams,” or the brain’s “memory traces.” For Sutton, the aforementioned 
integrated coordination is between the biological brain and “exograms,” which 
occupies a wider category. Sutton’s preoccupation is in carving functional 
distinctions between those processes that involve “exograms” and those which do 
not, regardless of whether or not the functional outcome is the same. Some 
unique properties of “engrams” include: internal memory record; fixed physical 
media; constrained format; impermanence; large but limited capacity; limited 
size of single entries; not being easily refined; retrieval paths that are constrained; 
limited perceptual access in audition, with virtually none in vision. On the other 
hand, some properties of “exograms” include: external memory record; virtually 
unlimited media; unconstrained and reformattable; the possibility of 
permanence; virtually unlimited; unlimited iterative refinement; retrieval paths 
that are unconstrained; unlimited perceptual access, particularly with in vision, 
with spatial structure serving as useful.62  
 
61 Menary goes on to distinguish four different kinds of classes of bodily manipulation of the environment 
that “mediate” it. 1) Biological coupling: organism-environment relations. 2) Epistemic actions: directly 
manipulating the environment to make the completion of a cognitive task simpler. These epistemic actions 
manipulate an environment in order to reposition its informational state and result in a better state for 
problem solving or task planning. 3) Self-correcting actions: the use of language and syntactical props 
(gestures and other information-bearing elements) to direct and structure practical actions in completing 
tasks. Unlike epistemic actions, for Menary self-correcting actions do not involve a direct physical 
manipulation of the environment (this is a rather crude understanding of environment, however). 4. 
Cognitive practices: manipulations of external representational and notational systems regulated by 
cognitive norms. Richard Menary, “Dimensions of Mind,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, vol. 9, is. 
4, p. 563. 
62 “Exograms, however, are inherently very different from engrams. Whereas engrams are built-in devices, 
genetically limited to the format and capacity of the human central nervous system, exograms are virtually 
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Nonetheless, Sutton’s emphasis on “exograms,” with their unique retrieval 
features in comparison to episodic and procedural skills, offers little more than 
underscoring computational power, “rather than [focusing] on how they might 
truly modify and transform cognitive processes (not just ‘more’, but something 
really different).”63 This is another way to articulate what Catarina Novaes terms 
the “old idea” of first-wave EM—i.e., that the central cognitive impact of writing 
concerns an increase in working memory. Both Sutton and Clark’s interest in 
external representational systems are as they figure into serving as devices for the 
storage of information, or working as an external drive to consult and coordinate 
with. 
Joscha Bach presents a related model of mentality that incorporates and 
projects simulation in his Conductor Theory of Consciousness (CCT), which sees 
the logic of the Modified Parity Principle replicated into all representationally-
bound cognitive operations. Bach’s description delineates how a computational 
model can account for the phenomenology and functionality of consciousness.64 
Bach’s position is predicated upon how our nervous systems possess a multitude 
of feedback loops that respond to environmental data, such as the mechanisms of 
the brain stem regulating heart rate and breathing patterns. The human 
neocortex is described as a regulatory system that deals with needs and the 
encoding of sensory patterns into a hierarchical model of the environment, which 
also includes the inner environment.  
One could say that this projection of inner environment into outer 
environment is a dynamic model not just of mapping from past observation to 
future observations but also one that progressively updates, much like 
Solomonoff 's use of predicative Bayes. This progressively updated stateful 
function, as an iterative program that generates a simulation of the environment, 
 
unlimited in both format and capacity. Engrams are impermanent, at best lasting only as long as the life of 
a single individual; exograms can be made permanent, outlasting individuals and, at times, entire 
civilizations. Unlike engrams, systems of exogram storage are infinitely expandable, lending themselves to 
virtually any system of access, cross-indexing, cataloging, and organization [....] Thus, a cognitive system 
containing exograms will have very different memory properties from a purely biological system.” Merlin 
Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 315. 
63 Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Formal Languages in Logic, p. 182. 
64 Joscha Bach, "The Cortical Conductor Theory: Towards Addressing Consciousness in AI Models" in 
Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures, ed. A.V. Samsonovich, BICA Society Annual Meeting, 2018. 
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finds the formalization of (biological) needs rather than desires. Through data 
compression—optimizing data structure that allows for the most accurate 
prediction of future observations based on past observations—Bach replicates 
Solomonoff 's inductive modeling for a computational agent that can give their 
environment form by capturing apparent invariances of the world into what 
appears as a static model, bringing variances into elliptical stable state(s). This, in 
turn, affects decision by way of probabilistic projection, where cognitive 
prepatterned modules are externalized into conceptual evolutionary manifolds:  
“[b]y varying the state, such a model cannot only capture the current state of the 
world, but be used to anticipate and explore possible worlds, to imagine, create and 
remember.”65  
According to CTC, our conceptual manifold is organized and manipulated 
using a grammatical language, which allows for the synchronization of concepts 
between speakers even when there is no shared corresponding sensory-motor 
script. Thus, the “shape” of the conceptual manifold is inductively processed in 
an act of machine translation where there is a lack of corresponding mental 
simulations. According to Bach's CTC program, coordinated perceptual 
differentiation can be supplemented with coherence and reflection such that 
AGI-consciousness could be potentially formulated via sensory motor scripts 
predicated on approximation.  
With the exception of Bach, the previous elaborations and permutations of 
the Extended Mind thesis do not find themselves replicated qua desire vis-à-vis 
any AGI. That is, rather than offshore that program into a novel feedback circuit, 
a preprogrammed AGI will come to a halt if it is not able to execute a “desire-
command.” Bach underscores how in the human brain the functionality of the 
cortical conductor is linked to a protocol of what is attended to, thus forging a 
series of links to experiences generated by other cortical instruments. In creating 
a scaffold of reference, this protocol partially recreates past states through mental 
simulations that reactively correspond the configuration of active regions with 
parameters from stored links. Thus, consciousness is a reactivation of past states 
of mental simulation that generate a re-enactment of a previous world state, i.e., 
 
65 Ibid., p. 18. 
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a memory. The external object-environment comports directly with memory 
here, bypassing desire and erecting something like a simulated environ that is 
recollected through physiological feedback storage. 
If phenomenal consciousness—by which Bach means epiphonema, the qualia 
of “what it is like”—can simply be understood as the most recent memory of what 
our prefrontal cortex attended to, then memory is a prosthesis of reference. 
According to CTC, these prostheses are stacked, as “attentional protocol can 
provide for binding of other cortical functionality into a single structure for the 
purpose of self-regulation,”66 such that, through protocol-references, we can 
enumerate some of the functionality that corresponds to a given conscious state. 
Thus, for CTC, conscious experience is not an experience of being in the world, 
or in an inner space, but a memory—"[i]t is the reconstruction of a dream 
generated [in] more than fifty brain areas, reflected in the protocol of a single 
region,” which stores and then recreates the experiential memory of being 
conscious.67 
§ V 
CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHIES OF MEDIA 
 
So far, our schematic genealogy of language and information-processing systems 
anticipates a formalized evolutionary theory in which the emergence of mind 
from nature—but also AGI’s distinctiveness—can be explained by way of 
inference. We will return to such questions but let us also engage with a review of 
the continental tradition of media-as-extension, so as to uncover its complicities. 
The nature of many of our questions have been directed towards inference and 
induction and these interests more or less escape the entirety of continental 
philosophy of media. Yet there may be good reason to historically review how 
media and cognition are consolidated in the lineage of philosophers of “technics” 
with particular interest in how something homologous to “meta-language,” or 
even a noumenal border-concept such as Hegel’s spirit—wherein difference is 
grounded in essence and within a genus that divides itself under essential 
 
66 Ibid., p. 23. 
67 Ibid., p. 22. 
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determinations—blossoms from Ernst Kapp through to André Leroi-Gourhan. 
Admittedly, some of the thinkers of continental comport have a rather crude and 
reductive treatment of semantics, where language in the philosophy of technics 
designates how we talk about media and their extended cognitive relationships 
but is not treated as a condition for media’s have such extended cognitive 
relationships.  
One dominant theory of technology begins with Ernst Kapp, who coined the 
phrase “philosophy of technology” in 1877. Kapp was a Hegelian philosopher 
whose work seeks to demonstrate technics as the synthesized projection of organs. 
In Philosophy of  Nature, Hegel constructs concepts that define the mechanical, the 
chemical and the organic, demonstrating that these are instantiated in our 
experience of the world.68 The acting self and absolute spirit come into synthesis 
for Hegel in human expressions such as but not limited to art, religion and 
philosophy. Via absolute spirit, the eternal idea in and of itself keeps itself 
concentrated and reproduced, continually regenerating itself and enjoying its 
eternal status. By demonstrating an inner affinity between the constructed tool 
and the human organ, Kapp’s notion of organprojektion (“organ projection”) 
facilitates a constructive affinity that is drive-based, as artefactual technesis results 
in the human being’s made partial, or dividuated, such that the artefact serves as 
a means of reproduction. Here, however, it is not language that is reproduced, 
but something primordial and biological—for Kapp, this is the well of cognitive 
activity from which language is drawn and it is made reproducible via tool-
construction. With the organ now partially separable from the entirety of Being, 
its practicability is defined and derived through usage and growing complexity. 
As Jeffrey West Kirkwood and Leif Weatherby remark: 
 “[t]he telegraph articulates a point that the ax could not have alone: objective spirit 
borders on absolute spirit in the expression of the unity of idea and material, here 
modeled on the brain. This moment is crucial in Kapp’s exposition and imparts a 
Hegelian core to his form of posthumanism. He [Kapp] asks rhetorically: ‘We have 
seen the unconscious take part in the emergence of the tool’s basic forms and in 
their nearest modifications. Is it supposed to cease participating when we realize 
[vergegenwärtigen] that even the highest achievements [Leistungen] of conscious 
artefaction [Artefaktion] ultimately, in their turn, unconsciously serve the progressive 
 
68 G.H.W. Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, trans. M.J. Petry. London, Allen & Unwin, 1970. 
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revelation [Offenbarung] of the entire human being as thought-entity 
[Gedankenwesen]?’”69  
For Kirkwood and Weatherby, Kapp’s “organ projection” is cognitively 
substantiated by the growth of networks of communication, which not only 
imitate the directional movements of the central nervous system but, more 
importantly, the function of material transmission vis-à-vis absolute spirit. Thus 
transpires the ontological paradox of dialectical historicity as premised on an 
open Whole that is irremediably ruptured by its own absolute negativity. 
Following Hegelian synthesis, the supposed transcendental subject is solely an 
autonomous agent insofar as they are suspended in the self-organizing process of 
Geistig, whereby Dasein, or presence, is encapsulated in the generative 
combinatorial processes afforded by discretized iteration and recursive activity. 
With Kapp’s description of artefactual processes (chiefly tool-making), recursion 
is a scaffolding—a memory-driven and generative cognitive process where the 
performance of each action is built upon the history of previous actions.70 In turn, 
according to theories of artefactual extension which build upon the Idealist 
tradition, anatomico-endogenous processes proffer adaptively and according to a 
kind of transcendent causality, or in accordance to a kind of “essential will”:  
“[t]he crooked finger becomes a hook, the hollow palm a bowl. In the sword, spear, 
oar, shovel, rake, plow, pitchfork, one can easily trace the dynamic tendencies of 
the arm, the hand, and the fingers and their adaptation to activities such as hunting, 
fishing, planting, and harvesting. As the stylus elongates the finger, so the lance 
elongates the arm, augmenting its action of force while at the same time, by 
decreasing the distance to the goal, also increasing the odds of reaching it—an 
advantage further compounded by the momentum of the lance in flight.”71  
The concrete universal in the Kantian synthetic a priori dictates continuation 
and completion, as in the example of a triangle where, given two sides and an 
angle, one can find the third side and remaining two angles. The basis of the 
mediate judgment of inference is characterized in the identity pervading a 
manifold of differences that is instrumentalized as a scaffolding for further 
 
69 Ernst Kapp, Elements of a Philosophy of Technology, trans. L.W. Wolfe, eds., J.W. Kirkwood and L. 
Weatherby, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2018, p. xxviii. 
70 Reza Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, Falmouth, Urbanomic, 2019, pp. 321-322. 
71 Ernst Kapp, Elements of a Philosophy of Technology, p. 38. 
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inference. This is exactly what is repeated with the construction of instruments 
for Kapp, where mediate judgments express a dimension along which universals 
exert authority over those particulars upon which they are applied. The specific 
tool-concept characterizes and negotiates authority over the crooked finger, style, 
lance and so on.   
In Eduard von Hartmann’s The Philosophy of  the Unconscious (1869), the 
unconscious is identified as the ideational driver for the artificial construction of 
a world external to the human psyche. Contra Kant's immanent import of 
causality, for von Hartmann sense-impressions are prefigured by some “Non-Ego 
independent of the Ego.”72 Von Hartmann adopts the independence of 
physiological volition from Berkeley and Fichte,73 and this conception of 
discretization figures prominently into Kapp’s organic conception of technē.  
Kapp’s project of incipient organ-practicability and demonstrative prosthetic 
designation as a requisite dialectical process is continued with Arnold Gehlen. 
Gehlen’s work on technologies and institutions as “ersatz organz” is predicated 
on conceptual deficiency (Mangel), whereby conscious artefaction compensates 
that which is “unfinished” or inherently “lacking” in the human, thereby allotting 
a predatory form of survival.74 Here we see von Hartmann’s unconscious reappear 
as instinct. Gehlen’s description of artefaction reifies Hegelian “infinitude” as 
abstracted representation. As a psychological phenomenon, Gehlen’s artefaction 
consists of “handling things, immediately in our consciousness, and even in our 
outwardly directed activity and in the limbs of our body.”75 Following the 
Hegelian thread of the essential self-positing unity of immediacy and mediation, 
 
72 Eduard von Hartmann, The Philosophy of the Unconscious, Abdington, Routledge, 2019, p. 290. 
73 “Fichte, again, after all his unsuccessful attempts to weave the Non-Ego entirely from the Ego, cannot do 
without an external impulse for this activity of the Ego, and this impulse stands with Fichte for the true 
Non- Ego. Berkeley, too, suggests a transcendent cause for every perception, referring everything, however 
(overleaping the world of things in themselves), without distinction, directly to the Absolute, i.e., foregoes 
the attempt to explain our perceptions, and every attempt to penetrate the mystery of the real connections 
of their special originating causes.” Eduard von Hartmann, The Philosophy of the Unconscious, pp. 290-291. 
74 Arnold Gehlen, Die Seele im technischen Zeitalter, Munich, GRIN Verlag, 2007. Reza Negarestani also offers 
a similar description of the suspension of the ego via artefaction; in an act of dynamic translation, “the 
predator makes the prey a prosthesis of itself.” "Unidentified Gliding Object: The Day the Earth Was 
Unmoored," ŠUM, vol. 11, 2019, p. 1632. 
75 G. W. F. Hegel, The Hegel Reader, ed. Stephen Houlgate, §65- §66, 1998, p. 166. 
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the immediacy of artefacts and their use-value indicates the interplay of cognitive 
activity embedded in them. Gehlen’s artefaction involves the object-ification of 
“knowing,” which “inwardises, recollects itself out of immediate being” and, 
“through this mediation find essence,” fulfilling the Hegelian terms of “mediated 
knowing.”76 
In opposition to Socrates, the Cynics and the Stoic philosophers, the denial 
of philosophy as lived biography is central to Hegel’s confluence with Aristotle’s 
conception of philosophy as λόγος (logos), or giving a rational account for the 
world.77 This rejection of the immediate in favor of the mediate is also in 
agreement with Hegel’s idea of conquering nature by way of its annihilation, 
yielding its transformation into the Idea in and for itself, or into the self-realization 
of the Absolute. Nonetheless, Hegel’s rejection of immediacy does not mean that 
he rejects infinite—quite the opposite, as Hegel’s philosophy is one of rendering 
infinitude mediate. Recalling his work on aesthetics and mediation, in 
“Philosophy of the Absolute Spirit” Hegel remarks: 
"[no]w as the pulsating heart shows itself all over the surface of the human, in 
contrast to the animal, body, so in the same sense it is to be asserted of art that it 
has to convert every shape in all points of its visible surface into an eye, which is 
the seat of the soul and brings the spirit into appearance. — Or, as Plato cries out 
to the star in his familiar distich: 'When thou lookest on the stars, my star, oh! would 
I were the heavens and could see thee with a thousand eyes', so, conversely, art 
makes every one of its productions into a thousand-eyed Argus, whereby the inner 
soul and spirit is seen at every point. And it is not only the bodily form, the look of 
the eyes, the countenance and posture, but also actions and events, speech and 
tones of voice, and the series of their course through all conditions of appearance 
that art has everywhere to make into an eye, in which the free soul is revealed in 
its inner infinity."78 
Recall Hegel’s oft-quoted apothegm, “der Geist ist ein Knochen,” frequently 
translated as “the spirit is the bone.” The bone-as-artefact demonstrates that in both 
his work on the Absolute Spirit and material speculative iteration, Hegel’s subject 
 
76 G. W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. J.N. Findlay, Abdington, Routledge, 2015, p. 389. 
77 Whereas, for Socrates, the Stoics, Nietzsche and Foucault, philosophy is primarily concerned with the 
technē (τέχνη) of transforming one’s bios (βίος). See: John Sellars, The Art of Living: The Stoics on the Nature 
and Function of Philosophy, Bristol, Bristol Press, 2009, pp. 2-11. 
78 G.W.F. Hegel, The Hegel Reader, p. 429. 
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is incorporated in its negativity79—it is through the bone-as-artefact that the 
remainder of spirit as absolute becomes manifest.  
In his work on "Animal Societies" (“Des sociétés animals”), Alfred Espinas, a 
positivist-turned-realist, further builds upon Kapp’s underdeveloped (or 
“lacking”) Promethean man, identifying prosthetic tool-making with restorative 
completion. In particular, Espinas theorizes that artefaction is related to pre-
societal relationships associated with parasitism, commensalism and mutualism.80 
Espinas’ conception of mutualist prosthesis is further complicated by Leroi-
Gourhan, from whom Stiegler’s contemporaneous use of “exosomatization” is 
derived. Leroi-Gourhan theorizes that, in addition to the liberation of organs, 
artefactual objects are the exteriorization of memory.81 The conversion of 
ontology through artefact is thus predicated on the conversion of the non-Ego to 
habit by making memory material. Consequently, a Hegelian synthesis of the 
mechanism of self-feeling occurs at the same time that memory becomes the 
mechanism of intelligence. By making memory material, Leroi-Gourhan’s 
artefaction imputes Hegelian recollective performance—recollecting self-
realization via mediated infinitude—and rationally reconstructs an implicit 
history of beliefs and normative attitudes.  
Yuk Hui’s project traces how “technology is complicit with an episteme that 
is fundamentally cosmological and irreducible to universal values.”82 For Hui, 
originary technicity is relative to the continuity of the irreducible. In every one of 
these philosophers’ literature on artefacts and technical instruments, we can 
discern the irreducible from Kant’s ahistorical pure intuition of human reason 
(the functor of the Transcendental Decision) or the nonhistorical natural 
determination of being from Hegel’s eternal world spirit (Weltgeist).83 
 
79 Johan Vandycke, “The Spirit (Of Our Time) Is and Is Not a Bone,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of 
Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 3, nos. 2-3, 2007. 
80 Emmanuel d'Hombres, “Un organisme est une société, et réciproquement?,” Revue d'histoire des sciences, 
vol. 62, no. 2, 2009, pp. 395-422 (original translation). 
81 Ándre Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech, trans. A.B. Berger, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1993. 
82 Yuk Hui, Recursivity and Contingency, New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2019, p. 266 
83 “The Idea, Spirit, transcends time because it is itself the Notion of time; it is eternal, in and for itself, and 
it is not dragged into the time- process because it does not lose itself in one side of the process.” G.W.F. 
Hegel, Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), Part II, ed. A.V. Miller, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2004, § 258, p. 36. Even prior to German Idealism and subsequent Idealist 
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§ VI  
SIMONDON & THE PREDICTIVE MIND  
Gilbert Simondon remains a singular and unreplicated thinker in the continental 
tradition of philosophy of technology.84 For Simondon, any media paradigm 
depends on the aperture of informational transmission and Simondon’s interest 
in the egalitarian relationship between technics and man is bifurcated into a 
status of “majority status” and “minority status” of technical objects. The 
“minority status” of a technical object is first and foremost attributable to an 
object that carries implicit use-value and habitus, with this essentially having 
developed during childhood. “Minority” technical knowledge is implicit, 
nonreflective and habitual. Conversely, what Simondon describes as the 
“majority status” corresponds to an operation of reflection and self-awareness, as 
“the means of rational knowledge, elaborated through the sciences.”85 The 
question of implicit and explicit, the dialectical relation of exterior artefacts and 
the interior cultivated knowledge of utilizing them, is central to Simondon. 
Furthermore, Simondon notes that: 
“[t]he representation of the craftsman is drowned in concreteness, engaged in 
material manipulation and sensible existence; it is dominated by its object; the 
representation of the engineer is one of domination; it turns the object into a bundle 
 
philosophy, the irreducible has, historically, been a philosophical arche-artefact of deductive cognition. 
Recall that, in the Meno, Socrates insists that one can know nothing of virtue intrinsically and that, rather, 
it is through dialogue and interrogation, or sociability and deduction, that the nature of virtue can reveal 
itself. Consequently, Socrates calls upon an uneducated slave from Meno’s retinue, querying whether this 
boy knows how to calculate the double of the area of a square. As he draws a square in the sand, followed 
by diagonal lines, Socrates claims that the slave boy “spontaneously” recovers the solution to this problem. 
Exteriorizing the calculation, technesis involves the synthesis of the hypomnesic inscription within the 
inorganic domain (the sand). 
84 Although Simondon engages with vitalism to some extent, recalling Bergson when he speaks of "potential 
energy" and "actual energy" (for instance, in his detailed study of transducers), this strategic implementation 
is more so in order to describe how there is homeostatic modulation in energy transference with such 
machines (e.g., Ashby’s homeostat). There is no reason we can not do away with Bergson's vitalism and 
codify coherent work in order to retain Simondon's description of thermodynamic or homeostatic machines' 
moving from one state of constrained equilibrium to another via external manipulations. Although he does 
not rely upon it, Simondon does repeat Kapp's gesture when he states that "for the tool is an extension of 
the organ, and it is carried by gesture.” Gilbert Simondon, On The Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2017, p. 130. 
85 Ibid., p. 104.  
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of measured relations, a product, a set of characteristics.”86 
Recall how, for Descartes, physical representeds were only known as mediated 
by our mental representings of them; as a consequence, representings were presented 
immediately to consciousness, yielding a kind of direct, incorrigible knowledge 
by acquaintance about one’s mental states. For Simondon, there is something 
akin to a technical subconsciousness that cannot be verbalized in clear terms via 
reflective activity but is intuited; this does not, however, amount to language’s 
being secondary to this reflective activity or as being constituted by it.87  
Refocusing upon the providence of intention thus redirects considerations 
regarding media to the mind and the constitutive rapport of participation, i.e., a 
transmission of information. As Simondon notes, by considering any media 
element as a directive of participatory reference—from ideal numbers to 
thermodynamic machines—fundamental structures can define being 
independently of any “sensible given.”88 Correlatively, as with Plato’s teachings on 
the ideal numbers in mathematics or, much later, with conditional 
necessitarianism bolstering the ideal fixture of scientific rationality, the “human 
individual seeks to be immortalized in the sensible, i.e. in becoming.”89 The 
continental tradition in general reiterates that technical objects not only 
instantiate a static history but a “becoming.”  
Distinguishing a theory of machines that are not based on positive or negative 
feedback vis-à-vis registration, as with first order cybernetics, Simondon (often 
writing in response to an implicitly present Norbert Wiener) is explicitly 
concerned with demarcating a different category of machines—in particular, a 
machine that can exist without contributing a relation between the chain of 
 
86 Ibid., p.105. 
87 Accordingly, this technical subconsciousness “cannot be verbalized in clear terms by reflective activity, in 
farmers or shepherds, capable of directly grasping the value of seeds, the exposure of a plot, the best place 
to plant a tree or to set up a pasture so that it is sheltered and well positioned. These men are experts in the 
etymological sense of the term: they take part in the living nature of the thing they know, and their knowing 
is a one of profound, direct participation that necessitates an original symbiosis, including a kind of fraternity 
with a valued and qualified aspect of the world. Man here behaves like an animal who smells water or salt 
from a distance, who immediately knows where to choose the place for a nest without prior reasoning.” 
Gilbert Simondon, On The Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, p. 107. 
88 Gilbert Simondon, “History of the Notion of the Individual” in Individuation: Volume II, p. 487. 
89 Ibid., p. 460. 
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causality conveying the action and the chain of causality conveying the information. For 
Simondon, “there are machines that are not automatons or that at the very least 
do not convey automatisms except through secondary or temporary and 
occasional functions (for example, those that guarantee security, 
servomechanism, or remote control).”90 
This question of relational interiority and exteriority is complexified by the 
distinction between first-order and second-order cybernetics, however. In 1948, 
Wiener noted that "the social system is an organization like the individual, that it 
is bound together by a system of communication.”91 Simondon’s critique is that, 
in collapsing the social system with the individual, Wiener bolsters an energestic 
theory of form-taking, which prevents any veritable formulation of prediction. 
Wiener’s cybernetics, for Simondon, makes it very difficult to introduce 
probabilistic theories into the social domain, “since the more the samplings are 
broadened, the more heterogeneous they are.”92 Wiener's non-probabilistic 
method does not grant any privilege to stable configurations. Unlike Wiener, 
Simondon’s concern is with how and why groups change in accordance with the 
conditions of metastability. 
However, this same critique could not be effectively levied against second-
order cybernetics. Applying W. Ross Ashby and Heinz von Foerster’s cybernetic 
constructivism to observing systems, “second order cybernetics” prompted a 
radical turn by introducing the endo-model: every cybernetic system was 
understood as a cognitive system modelled along adequation and relative to the 
unstable position of an observer.93 This presciently foretold how predictive 
processing would eventually frame the architecture of synthetic intelligence as an 
architecture of motivated cognition as well, with intelligence understood as the 
homeomorphic tracking of the world vis-à-vis bottom-up probabilistic patterns.  
 
90 Gilbert Simondon, “Individuation and Invention” in Individuation in Light of Notions of Form and Information: 
Volume II: Supplemental Texts, trans. T. Adkins, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2020, p. 427. 
91 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, Cambridge, MA, MIT 
Press, 1961, p. 24. 
92 Gilbert Simondon, “Form, Information, and Potentials,” in Individuation: Volume II, p. 695. 
93 First order cybernetics was based on flack and recursion, where second cybernetics emphasized the 
“recursion of recursion” (or “the observing of observing”). Heinz von Foerster, Understanding Understanding: 
Essays on Cybernetics and Cognition, New York, Springer, 2003. 
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As second order cybernetics dealt with the “recursion of recursion” and the 
“observing of observing,” it presaged today’s algorithmic modes of predictive 
patterning and, more specifically, predictive coding, which is “one specific 
implementation of predictive processing that rests on algorithms developed in the 
setting for data compression.”94 Here, compression is a form of discretization by 
way of implemented measurement, a byproduct of the cognitive mind’s visuality 
and apperceptive ordering. Recalling Giuseppe Longo’s position on complexity, 
we are reminded that, despite the networks of artificial neurons of "the new AI" 
(e.g., machine learning and neural nets) are based on continuous variations of 
connectivity, they are conditioned by physical measurement and modeling, 
"which is always an interval, always approximate."95  
Second-order cybernetics’ generative predictive coding model accounts for 
the interoceptive contribution of the body and environment in ecologically 
structuring sensorimotor interactions. This program is akin to Simondon’s 
description of “ground” and “form” as an inventive process, wherein “the relation 
of the ground and the form is inalienable” and “the perception of the individual 
totally integrated into the community is to some extent an abstract simulated 
perception; instead of extracting the object from the world, it [perception] cuts 
up the world according to categories that correspond to the classifications of the 
community, and it establishes bonds of affective participation between beings 
according to these communal categories.”96 Second order cybernetics also recalls 
the Helmholtzian principle of "perception-as-interference." Hermann von 
Helmholtz insisted that perception involved a form of unconscious logical 
inference, preparing the foundations for the mind to be conceived of as 
information-processing device that is engaged in differentiation.97 According to 
knowledge-based apperception, stimulus (or that which Simondon terms “prior 
virtualities”) has to be translated into an internal representation (the 
“information” of the “associated milieu”) and, consequently, this representation 
 
94 Anil K. Seth, “The Cybernetic Bayesian Brain: From Interoceptive Inference to Sensorimotor 
Contingencies” in Open MIND, ed. Metzinger, 2015, p. 2. 
95 Giuseppe Longo, “Letter to Turing,” Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 36, no. 6, 2018, p. 80. 
96 Gilbert Simondon, “Individuation and Invention” in Individuation: Volume II, p. 430. 
97 Peter Norvig and Stuart J. Russell, Artificial Intelligence, p. 12. 
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is manipulated by cognitive processes to derive new internal representations 
(“determination”).98 Thereafter, these internal representations are “retranslated 
back into action,”99 or, in Simondon’s parlance, “the actual.”100 According to 
Kenneth Craik, having created a "'small-scale model' of external reality,"101 
cognitive organisms proffer the necessary capacity of apperception, utilizing past 
knowledge and, thereby, process an internal visualization of “relation-structure.” 
Continuing Craik’s work, experimental psychologist Donald Broadbent modelled 
apperception as information processing, conceiving of differentiation vis-à-vis the 
selective attention and filtering of perception.102  
As Ashby once noted “[t]he whole function of the brain can be summed up 
in: error correction,”103 paving the way for an action-oriented neuroeconomic 
model of predictive processing (PP).104 In PP, the passage from sensory percepts to 
modelling concepts is elaborated in terms of an inverse correlation between 
model detail and predictive horizons. The transition from variance to invariance 
is motivated by a probabilistic engine that adjusts at different spatio-temporal 
scales. In turn, if percepts are distinguished by a short-term horizon of prediction 
with rich detail, then concepts are characterized by coarse detailed and longer-
term prediction horizons. With its revere-engineering picture of mind, PP 
describes how a cognitive system progressively comes to track objective causal 
structure. While PP allots that we do not have access to the distal causes of 
sensory signals, it binds intuitions and concepts through schematic rules and, 
therein, isolates the most general dynamics which make cognition possible.105  
 
98 Gilbert Simondon, On The Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, p. 61. 
99 Peter Norvig et al., Artificial Intelligence, p. 12. 
100 Gilbert Simondon, On The Mode of Existence of Technical Objects, p. 61. 
101 K.J.W. Craik, The Nature of Explanation, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 61. 
102 Donald Broadbent, Perception and communication, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1958, p. 31. 
103 W. Ross Ashby quoted in Andy Clark, “Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future 
of cognitive science,” Behavior and Brain Sciences, vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 181-204. 
104 In order to avoid confusion we have chosen to designate PP for Predictive Processing rather than the 
Parity Principle. 
105 Kant adopted a top-down analytical approach as his central guiding principle in the transcendental 
method of argument, which justifies the existence of a concept or claim by demonstrating that it is a 
necessary condition for the possibility of some other fact of experience. Thus, those such as Link R. Swanson 
have made a strong case for the relation between PP and Kant. As Kant says in his 1783 Prolegomena to Any 
Future Metaphysics: “[w]e will start from the position that […] cognition is actual; but we must nonetheless 
 EKIN ERKAN 163 
 
PP sees the realization of Simondon’s dream, where the function of 
predictions is to extract useable models of regularities for the effective guidance 
of behaviour. The further up a level is, the more that level deals with modelling 
long-term regularities or tracking perceptual invariants (e.g., making plans or 
remembering past sequences of events). Levels at the bottom of the hierarchy are, 
instead, involved in predicting short-term events or keeping track of a presently 
occurring process. This, in turn, relates to the distinction of percepts from 
concepts: 
“[i]t seems the difference between percepts and concepts comes out 
in terms of a gradual movement from variance to invariance, via 
spatiotemporal scales of causal regularities. There is thus no 
categorical difference between them: percepts are maintained in 
detail-rich internal models with a short prediction horizon and 
concepts in more detail-poor models with longer prediction horizons 
[….] Percepts are thus basically shorter-term expectations and 
concepts longer-term expectations”106  
Similarly, Simondon's interest in minimizing free energy in regards to how 
organisms act to maintain themselves presaged Jakob Hohwy's contemporaneous 
work on predictive coding and processing, minimized prediction error, the 
selective sampling of sensory data, expected prediction and minimal complexity 
in internal models that map on to perception, action, attention and modelling.107 
Building on Predictive Processing, Hohwy’s project identifies all organisms as free 
energy minimizers, which entails that we see them as engaging in Bayesian 
inference. The implication for perception therefore emerges as a consequence of 
 
next investigate the ground of this possibility, and ask: how this cognition is possible.” Immanuel Kant, 
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science. ed Gary Hatfield, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004. Because of the Kantian application of this “top-down” style of analysis 
to the study of cognition and perception, Link supports the argument that PP has Kantian roots in Kantian, 
since some of the strongest advocates of the top-down analytical approach in cognitive science are those 
working on PP theories. Link R. Swanson, “The Predictive Processing Paradigm Has Roots in Kant,” Front. 
Syst. Neurosci, vol. 10: 79, 2016, pp. 1-13. 
106 Jakob Hohwy, The Predictive Mind, New York, Oxford University Press, 2013. 
107 Jakob Hohwy, “The neural organ explains the mind” in Open Mind, vol. 19, eds. T. Metzinger and J. 
Windt, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, 2015. 
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a more fundamental imperative that is concerned with organizational homeostasis, 
rather than a process of simply engaging in internal world-model construction.108  
In addition to the Kantian-Helmholtzian picture of reverse-engineering, PP 
accounts for the abilities that condition representation as evolutionary acquired 
and empirically trained. In turn, PP places an emphasis on empirical Bayes, or 
learned priors. Is language subsumed within this picture language? Despite it 
remains tethered to assessments of representational correctness or error, these 
empirical Bayes are not propositional or truth-functional states. Therefore, they 
do not pertain to the normativity and epistemic statuses instituted socially within 
a public language of asking and giving reasons. 
§ VII 
ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTION IN DERRIDA & STIEGLER: A CRITIQUE 
For Simondon, signification, or any operative in practice, is transindividual, 
meaning that it holds an antecedent and immanent status across a wide 
contributory hermeneutic platform of language-users. Accordingly, this is why, 
for Simondon: 
“it is absolutely insufficient to say that language is what allows man to access 
significations; if there were no significations to sustain language, there would be 
no language; language is not what creates signification; it is merely what conveys 
between subjects an information, which, in order to become significative, must 
encounter this ἄπειρον [ápeiron] associated with the definite individuality in the 
subject; language is the instrument of expression, the conveyance of information, 
but it does not create significations. Signification is a rapport of beings, not a pure 
expression; signification is relational, collective, transindividual, and it cannot be 
provided by the encounter of expression and the subject. We can say what 
information is based on signification, but we cannot say what signification is 
based on information. There are innate psychosomatic structures and dynamisms 
 
108 Anil K. Seth, “The cybernetic Bayesian brain: from interoceptive inference to sensorimotor 
contingencies” in Open MIND (MIND Group), eds. T.K Metzinger and J. Windt, pp. 1-24. 
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that constitute.”109 
For Simondon, language is instrumental, although the metalanguage, or 
“pure language” that is behind any implemented language, is not available to 
instrumentation. Nonetheless, linguistic expressions—the conveyance of 
information (i.e., inscriptions, texts, and so on)—are understood to be relational, 
collective and transindividual insofar as they provide for encounters of expression 
and the subject. We can say what information is based on by way of signification, 
but we cannot say what signification is based on by way of information. 
Signification is accounted for through a system of implementation. Signification 
is constituted at least in part by the logical grammar that is in tandem with certain 
syntactical rules of normative rank and is susceptible to commitment updating 
and epistemic change, or a logic of analogical reasoning. That is, language-as-
extensional media maps a formal description of the systems' causal organization 
which speaks to structural alignment.110 
For many of the aforementioned continental thinkers, explicitly Derrida, 
language is treated as a vessel for desire and a plurality of senses, operationally 
sewn and directed. This is why Derrida remarks that: 
“[l]anguage is a structure-a system of oppositions of places and values and an 
oriented structure. Let us rather say, only half in jest, that its orientation is a 
disorientation. One will be able to call it a polarization. Orientation gives direction 
to movement by relating it to its origin as to its dawning. And it is starting from the 
light of origin that one thinks of the West, the end and the fall, cadence or check, 
death or night. According to Rousseau, who appropriates here a most banal 
opposition from the seventeenth century, language turns, so to speak, as the earth 
turns. Here neither the orient nor the occident is privileged. The references are to 
the extremities of the axis around which the globe turns (polos, polein)…”111  
According to Derrida, language lacks any formal constitution in and of itself. 
How, then, does its capacity for truth-bearing contextual dependency, i.e., belief-
commitment, find itself linguistically structured? For Derrida, there is no suture, 
 
109 Gilbert Simondon, “Collective Individuation and the Foundations of the Transindividual” in Individuation 
in Light of Notions of Form and Information, trans. T. Adkins, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2020, 
p. 345. 
110 Robert Stalnaker, “The Problem of Deduction” in Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and Its Foundations, 
eds. J.E. Adler and L.J. Rips, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
111 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. G.C. Spivak, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1998, p. 216. 
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no smuggled signifier which becomes displaced within its chain of metonymic 
substitutions. Derrida’s self-referential language lacks a theory of detachment 
and, accordingly, one cannot exit the terrain of metaphysics.  
However, this by no means entails that we have to refute logocentrism. On 
the contrary, in unison with Brandom, we gladly note that “[w]e philosophers 
should be proud to acknowledge and affirm our logocentrism, but should also 
justify it by an account of the relations between meaning and use, conceptual 
content and discursive practice.”112  
Accordingly, scientific understanding is rational not because of its infallible 
foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise that “can put any claim 
in jeopardy, though not all at once.”113 Accordingly, empirical knowledge, like its 
sophisticated extension—science—is rational. In turn, no concept is intelligible 
independent of others—no claim is immune to epistemic challenge—and 
scientific theorization unfolds historically via paradigm shifts that render 
variegated unique frameworks incommensurable. Contra Derrida, however, this 
does not entail that the conceptualization or theorization of formal language 
infrastructure is an irrational processes without a direction. Catarina Novaes 
refers to a processes of “de-semantification” and “re-semantification,” which 
illuminate how formal languages can be detached and abstracted from any 
particular content in order to be applied to different contexts. The de-
semantifying ability of formal languages is tantamount to the explicit re-
enactment of mind outside of any particular individual experience or contextual 
meaning—formal language as the prosthesis of extended cognition and epistemic 
enablement.114  
When language is understood as formally structured, and computable, it can 
be hierarchized (e.g., Chomsky’s syntax arrangement’s hierarchy: recursively 
enumerable, context-sensitive, context-free and regular).115 Like Chomsky, Novaes 
argues for a conception of “the formal” as that which is prone to de-
 
112 Robert Brandom, Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2010, p. 43. 
113 Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the philosophy of mind, ed. R. Rorty, Harvard, MA, Harvard University Press, 
p. 250. 
114 Reza Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, pp. 321-322. 
115 Noam Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1965. 
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semantification and computability (although she argues that these must be kept 
apart). More broadly, Novaes identifies three variations of the formal that 
correspond to abstraction from subject-matter and content—the formal as: i) 
topic-neutrality; ii) abstraction from intentional content; iii) de-semantification. 
De-semantification, in treating symbols with a purely formal character (i.e., as 
having no meaning at all and non-symbolic, much like Meillassoux's kenotype)116 
corresponds to “the familiar idea that the abstraction in question concerns 
abstraction from all meaning whatsoever, i.e., that it amounts to what we could 
refer to as a process de-semantification of some portions of (written) language.”117 In 
this sense, to be “purely formal” amounts to rendering symbols as blueprints or 
inscriptions that have no meaning at all. This is not the self-referential scaffold of 
Derrida, however, nor the Aristotelian abstraction of form from matter. Novaes’ 
notion of formality corresponds to ignoring specifically the meaning or content of 
signs so as to render a universal language of computability, a Carnapian 
transformation of pure mathematical objects where symbols are no longer 
“signs,” properly speaking. In turn, derivation is formulated within a 
constitutional system with a set of transformation rules so as to define 
relationships between axioms. As is the case with science and the media objects 
with which we shape and record science’s purposive progress, this allows for the 
expansion of objectivity. 
For Derrida, words only refer to other words—an infinite regress—yet they 
do not form such a closed system that allows for a tractable model of objectivity. 
Since, for Derrida, language emerges from “nonlanguage,” it is always the 
artefact that comes first. Accordingly, caves paintings and inscriptions pre-date 
the possibility for formal linguistic identity.  
Reconstituting the Freudian death-drive as the Derridean archive-drive, 
 
116 The kenotype is posed against the semantic correlations in languages that pertain to the domain of sense 
(qualitative specificity) and, therefore, the subject’s experiential world. Thus, “the kenotype would be 
nothing other than the concept of a sign considered as a mark, as a material and individual thing pending 
its designation [….] The kenotype would then be nothing more than a concept: the concept of ‘a’ that is 
instantiated by this or that material a.” Quentin Meillassoux, “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A 
Speculative Analysis of the Sign Devoid of Meaning,” trans. R. Mackay and M. Gansen, in Genealogies of 
Speculation: Materialism and Subjectivity Since Structuralism, Bloomsbury, London, 2016, p. 167. 
117 Catarina Novaes, Formal Languages in Logic, p. 13. 
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Stiegler similarly negotiates metaphysics from within, producing a quasi-
materialist ontology that positively addresses the Hegelian Objective Spirit as the 
inscription of object-ified knowledge, according to which “objectified knowledge 
is the consequence of the epiphylogenetic formation that arose in life with the 
practical activity of human beings.”118 Stiegler’s explanatory ontologization of 
grammatization is akin to a half-formed functionalism that engages solely on the 
level of empirical content—it characterizes a system as functional in nature by 
treating its function in terms of stimulus-response dispositions. Stiegler does not 
differentiate conceptual activity from non-conceptual activity. For the early 
Hegelian theorists of externalization/projection, the Dasein of Geist supervened 
upon ontogenesis but, for Stiegler, there is no differential identity of acquisition. 
This is why, for Stiegler, metalanguage is not foundational for spoken language 
but simply a technic once it is externalized. Consider the following remarks: 
“Today, Chomsky […] distinguishes innate language, which he also calls private 
language, or I-language (for ‘internalized language’), from cultural languages, E-
language (for ‘externalized language’). This kind of notion is what leads Jerry Fodor 
to refer to what he calls ‘mentalese’. And it is a catastrophe […] I myself consider 
that language, just like writing, involves a recoding of prelinguistic cerebral 
functions (communicational and cognitive—for example, categorization functions), 
but that language nevertheless did not exist prior to this recoding. As for ‘private 
language’, it is an internalization by psychic individuation along a circuit of 
transindividuation that is originally social [….] The writing of which Wolf speaks 
is a more advanced form of that placing into exteriority that lies at the origin of 
language—an advanced form that changes language itself. But this is possible only 
because language is an originally social system founded on the artificial organ that 
the ‘word’ already is.”119 
Stiegler thinks that the distinction between private and external language is 
"catastrophic" because sociality precedes any idea of internalization. Yet, 
mentalese, or the language of thought, is never independent from socialization in 
its acquisition. It merely is not externalized (or, to recall Leroi-Gourhan, who 
Stiegler liberally quotes, "exosomatized"). Stiegler conflates the conditions for 
genesis of language with the conditions of its reproduction, as if Fodor thought 
 
118 Bernard Stiegler, The Nanjing Lectures: 2016 – 2019, London, Open Humanities Press, 2020, p. 270. 
119 Bernard Stiegler, The Nanjing Lectures, p. 218. 
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that one could learn mentalese in a vacuum. Stiegler is apparently taking issue 
with the fact that mentalese expressions are analogs of sentences and the syntax 
of spoken languages, claiming that Fodor takes what is a social artefact as a 
natural kind (i.e., the word). For Fodor, however, thought precedes spoken 
language and is not prior to thought. Thought is more primitive than discursive 
cognition and has a syntactical structure which mirrors some formal languages 
and much of natural languages.120 Stiegler, however, subordinates psychic 
individuation to techno-social individuation, and, therefore, "secondary 
retentions" (memory) to "tertiary retentions" (artefacts). In turn, Stiegler 
unwittingly ignores the discursive experience of giving and asking for reasons in 
language games. 
An inferentialist treatment of mediation requires adjustments and, in turn, 
sees judgments as mediate. This political process of adjusting one’s dispositions in 
order to configure and state immediate and mediate judgements in response to 
the conflicts that transpire from exercising them is the what Hegel designates as 
“experience.” “Experience,” however, is not just on the level of reception, as 
Stiegler describes, but drives the development of concepts, because it is the 
process of determining their content. By applying conceptual norms we are also 
simultaneously engaged in the process of instituting them, wittingly or not. The 
conceptual content in question is determinate because they are inferentially 
determined, i.e., entangled in the negotiation between that which is 
authoritatively acknowledged and the process of administering at times opposed 
authorities of particulars and universals when in disagreement.121  
Consider the following scenario, plucked from Brandom. In Brandom’s terms, 
what distinguishes the non-conceptual activity of a parrot that squawks "the rose 
is red!" from the conceptual activity of a human who says "the rose is red!" is that 
parrots do not have or understand the concept of "red" (or "redness"), as parrots 
cannot exchange commitments to “redness.” Nonetheless, both humans and 
parrots can share reliable differential responsive dispositions, or response-
selectivity, but only meta-language bearers can commit themselves to and can be 
 
120 Jerry A. Fodor, LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. 
121 Robert Brandom, Recollections of Idealism, trans. F. Hamann and A. Shoichet, Berlin, Suhrkamp Verlag, 
2015, p. 284. 
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held accountable for what they express as having a reliably biased differential 
disposition towards objects and their properties.122 Traditionally, non- or pre-
linguistic animals and machines are understood to not deploy concepts or acquire 
beliefs, but are attributed informational states that functionally resemble the 
conspecifics of sapience.123 For Brandom, just as for Fodor, thought precedes 
spoken language and is more primitive than discursive cognition because it has a 
syntactical structure that mirrors the structure of natural languages and some 
formal languages (e.g., computational programming languages). 
The normative description of mind allows cognition to be subject to an 
evaluation of success or failure within a socialized system, such that the potential 
for malfunction, misperception, or error is determined along a physical, 
phenomenological, discursive or social gradient. Such functional descriptions 
thus describe non-cognitive systems as behaving in a purpose-oriented manner, 
making use of intentional and teleological vocabulary while attributing sapience 
with extra-representational content. For Stiegler, however, the language of 
thought is treated as dependent upon socialization in its acquisition.124 Stiegler—
unlike Simondon125—designates the even the purest a priori and all necessary 
knowledge we may hold in our mind’s eye as emerging from the depths of 
organic-technological encounters.  
We ought to also note, in the spirit of the scientific image and our rationalist 
ethos, that Derrida and Stiegler’s program has now been unobjectionably 
evidenced as incorrect, in part due to Scott H. Frey's research with functional 
magnetic resonance imaging and retrieved stored praxis representations in 
minimally informative stimuli response to randomly ordered verbs denoting 
 
122 Particularly as responsiveness relates to objects’ properties via sensa/qualia/epiphenomena. 
123 Brandom, Making It Explicit, pp. 889-900. 
124 This is evident when Stiegler remarks that: “it is because the word is already an artificial organ that the 
written word can come to replace the spoken word (this is what underlies Derrida’s reasoning in 1967 in Of 
Grammatology). Speakers internalize words and individuate themselves by exteriorizing this 
internationalization in what one calls expression, and thereby contribute to the formation of circuits of 
transindividuation. The study of such circuits falls within general organology, and what Vygotsky called the 
instrumental method, which studies instrumental acts, which in turn rest on what we call tertiary retention.” 
Bernard Stiegler, The Nanjing Lectures, 31. 
125 Despite Stiegler is often grouped most closely with Simondon, I thus claim that he is much more akin to 
Derrida. 
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familiar tool-use actions or communicative gestures.126 Frey’s work provides 
neurological evidence consistent with hypothesized links between the origins of 
tool use and language, including the suggestion that tool use may have played a 
causal role in the evolution of gestural communication, but did not bring it forth. 
§ VIII 
CONCLUSION: INTERACTION, DISCRETE-STATES & DIGITALITY 
According to Hegel’s conception of Absolute Spirit, we transcend egocentricity 
through the dialectic of labor that operates through tools, reaching towards 
world-comprehension.127 With its interwoven Hegelian plexus, Negarestani's 
Intelligence and Spirit defends the Enlightenment notion of enabling constraint(s) 
and positive freedom, using the veritable scaffolding of intelligence as a practical 
canalization of interactive constraining and mutual limitation, rigorizing and 
sorting. Drawing out the terms of his computationalist functionalist program, 
Negarestani distinguishes two kinds of computation: i) intrinsic-mechanical 
computation, where computation is unbound from the semantics of utility; and ii) 
logical-algorithmic computation, where computation implements an algorithmic 
process that corresponds to goal-oriented behavior. For Negarestani:  
“[i]f by computationalism, we mean a general view of computation in which 
computation at the level of causal mechanisms and computation at the level of 
logico-conceptual functions are indiscriminately joined together and there is no 
distinction between different classes of computational function or computational 
models with their appropriate criteria of applicability to algorithmic and non-
algorithmic (interactive) behaviors, then nothing except a naïve bias-riddled 
computational culture comes out of the marriage between functionalism and 
computationalism.”128 
In turn, Intelligence and Spirit finds Negarestani negotiating Hegel with Carnap, 
 
126 Scott H Frey et al., “Tool use, communicative gesture and cerebral asymmetries in the modern human 
brain” in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, Biological Sciences, vol. 363, pp. 1951–1957. 
127 Arran Gare, “Consciousness, Mind and Spirit,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social 
Philosophy, vol. 15, no. 2, 2019, p. 243. 
128 Reza Negarestani, “Revolution Backwards: Functional Realization and Computational 
Implementation” in Alleys of Your Mind: Augmented Intelligence and Its Traumas, ed. M. Pasquinelli, Lüneburg, 
meson press, 2015, p. 141. 
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as, for Negarestani, "cognition is always a recognition."129 How does Negarestani’s 
implicit Carnap square with Putnam’s early “machine state functionalism,” given 
Putnam’s attempt to model the human mind as a probabilistic automaton with 
Turing machine input-output states? If Putnam’s attempt was to configure a 
successor theoretical framework to the Kantian investigation into invariant 
structures of cognition, then Negarestani’s project can be understood as a 
successor concept to the Hegelian concept of Geist vis-à-vis a computationalist-
functionalist register. Nonetheless, Negarestani’s Hegel is also recognizably co-
opted from Brandom, as Negarestani retains the methodological demarcation 
between metaphysical and transcendental dimensions of subjectivity. In fact, it is 
via this distinction that Negarestani is able to account for the multiple-
realizability of intelligence as a normative and discursive phenomenon, “through 
which the intentionality of the mind is understood in its social structure.”130 Like 
Brandom, Negarestani’s constitution of concepts is mapped onto how norms are 
socially instated, prompting a discursive space of interactivity between multiple 
agents. This is, in turn, how Geist obtains intelligence which is deprivatized.  
Wielding an interactionist approach to computation, whereby intelligence's 
artificialization is historically implicit, Negarestani’s canalization of human-level 
intelligence can only be re-realized within the cumulative trajectory of a multi-
agent system, or a social system of discursive constraints. Similarly, the objective 
world, as Hegel argued, is a recognitive accomplishment of public structuration and, 
consequently, Negarestani demonstrates that the interrelational order of 
compositional symbols allows relations between varied patterns, or "world-
picturings," to be “encoded, structured, singled out, and elaborated.”131 Such 
symbol-to-world relations are socialized as they are pattern-governed through 
regularities in order-relations through language and logic. But what, exactly, is 
patterned for Negarestani and is it solely that which is recognizable insofar as it 
is discrete, or does his confidence in a Carnapian universal learning machine 
presume that events are explicated in terms of qualitative predicates or function-
symbols without lapsing into an infinite regress? 
Discretization is, of course, by no means a novel program and it has become 
 
129 Reza Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 353; p. 421. 
130 Daniel Sacilotto, Saving the Noumenon, p. 139. 
131 Reza Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 303. 
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the subject of much philosophical debate in the last decade, particularly in 
discourses related to continuous computation. In his seminal work on “Logical 
Computing Machines,” Turing foresaw of a "universal machine" with "unlimited 
time and unlimited storage capacity."132 Further detailing the prospects of a 
“digital computer,” Turing wrote of "discrete state machines," or a machine that, 
despite its ability to move through different states continuously (re: internal inputs 
and signal processing), appears as if it is, behaviorally speaking, moving through 
a succession of disparate instants.133 
Interestingly, Turing creates a dialectic between the discrete state machine 
and continuous computation where the discrete is empirically set between 
perception and its elliptical object in the evolutionary configuration of natural 
consciousness. For Turing, “[a] digital machine must essentially deal with discrete 
objects, and in the case of the ACE [Automatic Computing Engine] this is made 
possible by the use of a clock. All other digital computing machines that I know 
of except for human and other brains do the same.”134 The Turing machine’s 
"head and tape" is distinguished from the software, or the "program," as well as 
from the inputs involved but, despite the machinery of any organic cognitive 
systems is not entirely identical to the read-write head, “[a]ny algorithmic machine 
can be logically mapped into a universal Turing machine and a Turing machine 
program is logically isomorphic to any other model of universal computation. 
Thus, we consider Turing machines, parallel processors, Lambda calculi, Post 
machines, and many other models to all equivalently be computers.”135 The 
question then arises: if the justified use of expressions is what gives language the 
right conditions for commitment, how can these inferential relations be 
embedded in purely computational practices?  
While systems often cannot be effectively computed on with a finite state 
machine (e.g., a von Neumann computer), they can often be efficiently 
approximated. Comparatively speaking, the Turing machine merely gives us a 
behavioral account of imitating consciousness for an unsuspecting human which, 
 
132 Alan Turing, The Essential Turing, ed. B. Jack Copeland, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 413 
133 Ibid., p. 391. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Eric B. Baum, What is Thought?, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2004, p. 53. 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 174 
 
as Searle’s Chinese Room Experiment questions, apparently reduces intelligence 
into sequencing symbols—or syntactical language-to-world relationships—while 
omitting understanding.136 But is this omitment, as Negarestani comments, simply 
because Searle’s Chinese Room is a case of syntax devoid of meaningfully 
conferred contentful roles, i.e., a “syntax, [which, in Searle’s case, is not] under 
the right conditions”?137  
Searle’s “derivation from axioms” is seemingly inattentive to the fact that 
formal computation programs are not merely representational structures but also 
engaged in representing activities. Searle’s “understanding-deprived syntax” 
reduces the understanding of semiology to intentionality without specifying any 
success-conditions for this reduction. As Samson Abramsky's geometry of 
dynamic interaction demonstrates, semantics is not something that can be added 
on to symbols independently of their process-relative role, as semiology is 
essentially dependent upon the structure of such (interactive) processes. This is 
exemplified by the string sequencing produced in any typed programming 
language, where certain symbols (variables) are given concrete representational 
constraints (a certain range of specified values) by the processes that they are 
deployed in (the programs).138  
In agreement with Abramsky, Dina Goldin and Peter Wegner launch a similar 
critique that we can apply to the Chinese Room, as that Searle fits in the category 
of:  
“intentional skeptics who believe that machines that simulate thinking cannot think, 
 
136 Confronting Searle’s Chinese Room experiment, we ought to be wary of launching the “Brain Simulator 
response” of Patricia and Paul Churchland, Margaret Boden’s “Robot response,” or any response that 
attempts to stump biological naturalism with complexity qua representational content—neurobiological 
causals processes are occurrent regardless of the complexity of neural states; rather, the question is relative 
to how representations and neural states acquire meaning and intentionality. The Turing machine is merely 
an abstract means of articulating what can and cannot be computed in the standard model of digital 
computation (which is equivalent to recursive functions and λ-calculus). Regardless of if a backpropagation-
network can be simulated by a more complex program running on the digital computer system (to be 
precise: a system with Von Neumann architecture), Searle’s “Chinese Room argument” still applies because 
it inherently can simulate such complex systems, regardless of the system’s complexity. John R. Searle, 
“Minds, brains, and programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences vol. 3, no. 3, 1980, pp. 417-457.  
137 Reza Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 338. 
138 Samson Abramsky, “Information, Processes and Games,” Philosophy of Information, vol. 8 (“Handbook of 
the Philosophy of Science”), eds. D. Gabbay and J. Woods, 2016. 
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because their behavior does not completely capture inner (intentional) awareness 
or understanding [….] Searle is an intentional skeptic who argues that passing the 
test intentionally did not constitute thinking because competence did not constitute 
inner understanding [….] Our assertion that interaction is more powerful than 
algorithms implies not only greater computing power but also greater thinking 
power of interactive machines.”139  
Accordingly, in order to properly conceive of how syntax under the right 
conditions amounts to contentful semantic interaction, we have to oppose 
interaction with algorithms, and consider how interaction provides a better 
model than Turing machines for object-oriented programming. The paradigm 
of interaction conceives of objects as interactive agents that can remember their 
past and provide time-varying services that are not expressible by algorithms. 
With Searle’s Turing machine-cum-Chinese Room and algorithms, the outputs 
in question are expressible by memoryless and history-independent inputs. This 
is not the case in interactive systems such as personal computers, airline 
reservation systems, and robots, which allot history-dependent services over time 
that can learn from and adapt to experience.140 Contra Searle’s Chinese Room, 
interaction-machines transform closed to open systems and express behavior 
beyond that computable by algorithms. 
Negarestani, clearly influenced by Goldin and Wegner’s opposition of 
algorithms with interaction, makes the claim that: 
 “[a]ny unpredictable behavior of the environment is registered as a perturbation 
for the system. A Turing machine shuts out the environment during the 
computation, and interaction is rudimentary represented through sequential 
algorithms. But interaction as in concurrent processes and synchronous or 
asynchronous actions between agents is irreducible to the sequential interaction as 
it is represented by distributed parallel systems. In contrast to the Church-Turing 
paradigm, the interactive paradigm considers computation to be the natural 
expression of the interaction itself. The behavior of the system evolves in response 
to and in interaction with the inputs from the external environment.”141 
According to Longo, the question between hardware and software as it relates 
 
139 Dina Goldin and Peter Wegner, “Principles of Interactive Computation” in Interactive Computation, eds. D. 
Goldin, S.A. Smolka, P. Wegner, New York, Springer, 2007, p. 30. 
140 Ibid., p. 42. 
141 Reza Negarestani, “Revolution Backwards,” p. 143. 
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to finite vs. discrete-state computation reiterates the distinction between object 
language and metalanguage, “as well as Tarski’s precise partition between syntax 
(the stepwise computations of a formal TM) and semantics (the class of 
computable functions, in extenso).”142 Longo has allotted a significant amount of 
attention to Turing’s work on discretization and continuous computation but also 
lifted these categories as conceptual ideals. In his writing with Francis Bailly, for 
instance, Longo specifies that whereas computing is conceived of, in its ideal 
form, through causal discretization, physics considers material phenomena 
according to their continuous nature. Building from the Recursion Theory of Per 
Martin-Löf, Longo distinguishes the computable world as discerned by the 
import and the interplay of a knowing subject and the surrounding world which 
does not intrinsically "reveal" itself because we understand causality only by 
continuous interactions and/or in continuous fields.143 For Longo, a true object-
oriented interaction of contentful semantics where the computational operation 
is of an interactive stripe (between agents) that represent different strategies of 
action requires an elliptical processual framework; this entails the discrete, 
arithmetical thinking of the universe as an elliptic coordinate system.144  
Longo's work on continuous computation further details Turing's idea of 
“radically separated software,” or “the programming or re-writing rules”145 where 
what is formally implemented is the rule of replacement. This notion of iterative 
computational construction reminds us of Negarestani's conception of 
digitization, where digitality is a byproduct of deletion that is followed by 
generative supplementation.146 Thus, Negarestani and Longo’s rendering of the 
 
142 Giuseppe Longo, "The difference between Clocks and Turing Machines," La Nuova Critica, no. 29, 1994, 
p. 214. 
143 Francis Bailly and Giuseppe Longo, Mathematics and the Natural Sciences: The Physical Singularity of Life, 
London, Imperial College Press, 2011, p. 280. 
144 Drawing from Jacques Hadamard and Joseph-Louis Lagrange, Mark Wilson provides for such a 
program: re-express our governing equations in elliptic coordinates on a target system via a modification of 
Euler’s method to suit altered coordinates to supply reliable results at a much larger step size. Physics 
Avoidance, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 111. 
145 Giuseppe Longo, “Quantifying the World and its Webs: Mathematical Discrete vs Continua in 
Knowledge Construction,” Theory, Culture and Society vol. 36, no. 6, 2019, p. 67. 
146 Negarestani recalls that the domain of the digital is that of mechanizability, realized by deletion: “discrete 
inputs, discrete states, and discrete outputs,” whereby “what is erased […] has to be replaced by new 
supplements—every figure loses something but also is supplemented with new lines and diagrammatic 
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digital provides a meticulous reading of digitality as a concept. This is much more 
comprehensive an understanding in comparison to relegating the digital to 
exacting the evental distinction upon something that was formally 
indistinguishable and, therein, conceiving of it as the transcendental functor of 
relational becoming (i.e., the digital as the exacting of a division or distinction).147  
If the digital in-itself is discretely composed of simple, indivisible minima 
insofar as it is analogously presented to observers, what of the analog, i.e., those 
media objects brought into relation? The analog system, in contrast, allows for 
infinite extractions of information (through relations, analysis and so on) and 
infinite extractions, as “reality in itself, though not epistemically inaccessible, 
remains an epistemically inexhaustible resource out of which knowledge is 
constructed.”148 Here, Luciano Floridi, following Kant, takes the question 
concerning the ultimate digital/analogue status of reality as antinomical in 
nature, tracking the mutually translatable ontologies or “modes of presentation” 
of being. Whether in Bach's CTC memory-receipt feedback or with the 
embedding of index-measurements into a coordinated system, conceptual 
apprehension is met with the theoretical formalization of information. 
Accordingly, "the way a locator extracts information from raw data by modelling 
it is in any case relative to the dimensionality of a system’s coordinate/address 
system, which in cognitive systems is relative to the perceptual and cognitive 
capacities of the agent in question."149  
In turn, “[t]he world, at least as we […] experience it, might well be analogue, 
and the digital only a convenient abstraction or the result (and technical 
exploitation) of some physical features in our artefacts.”150 The multiple tracking 
orders of representation in question are endowed with invariant structural 
properties which make up the ultimate ontological referents for scientific study. 
Here, in closing, we are once again brought back to metalanguage’s possible 
 
configurations [….] the shift from the analogue to the digital should be regarded as a veritable worldmaking. 
In this process, continuities are deleted.” Reza Negarestani, Intelligence and Spirit, p. 430. 
147 As is Alexander Galloway’s position. Laruelle: Against the Digital, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press, 2014, p. 70. 
148 Luciano Floridi, The Philosophy of Information, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 331. 
149 Daniel Sacilotto, Saving the Noumena, p. 156. 
150 Luciano Floridi, The Philosophy of Information, p. 331. 
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world of extensional semantics. As with Novaes’ model of “formal-as-
desemantification,” a “formal language” requires underlying rules for 
manipulation even when there is no interpretation at play. Despite there do exist 
formal languages which are meaningful and not uninterpreted languages, as in 
Martin-Löf ’s constructive type theory, “the idea of manipulating symbols as 
blueprints with no meaning at all by themselves is not sufficient to constitute a 
formal language (or a formal system/theory).”151 Explicit and exhaustive rules of 
how to manipulate the symbols are also required—these relations that are made 
explicit in and as laws which specify what is necessary and what is possible, i.e., 
induction vis-à-vis projectible predicates.152 Supplementing Brandom and 
Negarestani’s conception of social commitment and socialized intelligence, we 
now point to socialization as it levels into the terrain of nonterminating behaviors 
and the necessity of memory-beliefs when conceiving of reliable reflective 
judgments through objects of mediation, whether they be tools, artefacts or 
machines.  
 
151 Catarina Novaes, Formal Languages in Logic, p. 59. 
152 According to Goodman “new riddle of induction” (and returning to Carnap’s “simplicity”), in the 
definition of simple predicates there is no reference to temporality. Consider “grue,” an emerald that, when 
first examined before t1 (a point in the future) is green and when examined after t1 is blue. At this point in 
time, we have only observed green emeralds. However, they are also “grue” because we have examined 
them at the point in time before t1. Are all emeralds “grue” (projective induction qua the unobserved) or 
“green” (projective induction qua the observed) then? Goodman remarks that predicates like “green” can 
also be defined in a way that makes explicit reference to time by introducing the predicate “bleen.” An 
object is “bleen” if it is first examined before t2 and is blue, or is not first examined before t2 and is green. 
Goodman’s remark re: valid inductive inferences are those we decide in accordance with those past 
regularities that we have picked out using constraints in language and, concurrently, decide upon other 
inductive inferences as invalid. See: Nelson Goodman, Fact, fiction and forecast, Cambridge, MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1983, pp. 74-95. 
